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ABSTRACT 
Intrusion Detection Systems are designed to monitor a network environment and generate 
alerts whenever abnormal activities are detected. However, the number of these alerts can 
be very large making their evaluation a difficult task for a security analyst. Alert 
management techniques reduce alert volume significantly and potentially improve 
detection performance of an Intrusion Detection System.   
This thesis work presents a framework to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of an 
Intrusion Detection System by significantly reducing the false positive alerts and 
increasing the ability to spot an actual intrusion for Distributed Denial of Service attacks. 
Proposed sensor fusion technique addresses the issues relating the optimality of decision-
making through correlation in multiple sensors framework. The fusion process is based 
on combining belief through Dempster Shafer rule of combination along with associating 
belief with each type of alert and combining them by using Subjective Logic based on 
Jøsang theory.  Moreover, the reliability factor for any Intrusion Detection System is also 
addressed accordingly in order to minimize the chance of false diagnose of the final 
network state.  A considerable number of simulations are conducted in order to determine 
the optimal performance of the proposed prototype. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
Nowadays, computers are interconnected through global Internet. These interconnections 
between computer systems offer numerous advantages in each life domain. However, 
computer networks are an easy target for various intrusion attempts. Intrusion is an 
unauthorized attempt to gain control of computer resources.  These intrusions are 
growing more seriously, rapidly and aggressively with a passage of time. The most 
important challenge faced by network system administrators, since its invention is, the 
security and privacy of the data travel on the network. Information on these network 
systems is a valuable corporate asset and therefore more and more protective security 
efforts are being followed to protect these priceless assets. Organizations use various 
computer security tools to do damage control done by these intrusion attempts. Intrusion 
detection system (IDS) is one of the tools that determine unauthorized access attempts on 
the system network. IDS generate various intrusion detections reports and provide 
valuable information about the current system security status.  
Generally, IDS generate large volume of false alerts. These alerts could be of two 
types, false positive or false negative. According to Anastasios et al. [1994] false positive 
alerts are mistakenly generated by the IDS.  According to Axelsson [2000] false negative 
marked by the IDS as a non malicious event but in reality, it should be marked as 
malicious event. Over the time, researchers adopted various techniques to deal with the 
issue of large number of false positives alerts generation. These techniques include 
fusion, correlation and aggression, multi level alert clustering, probabilistic approach, 
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machine learning and data mining approaches. Each approach has its own advantages, 
disadvantages and alert management issues. Network designing, data rate, network data 
type and sensor selection also affects the final output of the IDS. This thesis work deals 
with the reduction of false positives through alert correlation and fusion process.   
Problem Statement 
According to Almgren et al. [2000] and [2001], most of the time IDS generate to many 
alerts through the process of one-to-one mapping between events and alerts. For system 
administrator, these overwhelming reports are difficult to read and take longer time to 
extract current situation of the network security. Additionally, the performance of IDS 
further affects by generating long list of false positive alerts. According to Alsubhai 
[2008], these false positives alerts are not real alerts. Investigating all these reported 
alerts manually and separating positive real alerts from the final listed alerts is extremely 
complicated and time consuming task for security experts. Moreover extra resources and 
care is required to accomplish this task error freely. In ideal situation, the IDS should 
detect all possible intrusions and report only real intrusions. Effectiveness of the IDS 
depends on its capability to detecting all malicious activities on the target systems. This 
capability is known as sensitivity of the IDS. According to Bass [1999] and [2000], 
sensitive IDS generates more alarms than the non sensitive one on daily basis. In an 
active operational middle size network, IDS could report several hundred thousand alerts 
a day, out of them 99 % might be the false alerts. Due to the huge volume of false alarms 
reported by any IDS, the possibility of ignoring the real threat by system administrator 
put data security in most dangerous situation.   
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The research reported in this thesis has focused on the ways to extend intrusion 
detection outcome with alert correlation and alert fusion process. The assumption has 
been that existing IDS are using various techniques to overcome the issue of false 
positives. The computer systems are itself under the protection of some basic security 
measures such as firewalls, authentication servers, IDS etc. When the security of a system 
is more important and possibility of making the current systems more secure exhausted 
through previous security techniques, other effective options need to be evaluated. This 
thesis has analyzed combination of two additional measures, which is correlation of 
intrusion alerts for more effective intrusion detection performance and fusion of alerts 
based on mathematical foundation to further minimize the negative effects of false alarm 
generation.  
Research Questions 
The process of surveying, proposing new methodology, testing and evaluating various 
alert correlation and fusion methods includes following research questions: 
- What technique and methods exist for intrusion alert correlation? 
- What technique and methods exist for intrusion alert fusion? 
- What are the various researchers worked in this field? 
- What are the short comings of previous work? 
- What are the open problems in this problem domain? 
- What are the various possibilities of data sets availability for experiments? 
- Which dataset is acceptable for experiments in research community? 
- What are the possible options for various sensors available for alert 
generation? 
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- What is the implication of combining alert correlation with fusion process? 
- Is it possible to customize the current Open Source to create effective 
intrusion alert system? 
- What are the possible computer attacks created so far and how their signature 
looks like? 
Methods 
To answer these research questions mentioned above, the following methods were used: 
- Detailed survey the research topic, understand the work done by previous 
researchers along with their shortcomings.  
- Design own system to address the issue of false alarms using system 
integration and system development techniques.  
- Experimental evaluation of implemented prototype.  
- Compare the proposed method result with other researchers output. 
Contribution 
We proposed new methodology for false positive alert reduction in Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attack by refining the fusion process through various correlation 
techniques. Our proposed fusion engine has strong mathematical foundation. Some small 
scale alert reduction rules and methods are also introduced on individual basis for various 
sensor types. For analysis and evaluation purpose, we used DARPA 1999 Dataset and 
two open source Intrusion Detections Systems, Bro and Snort. These selections are 
completely accordance with the acceptance of Intrusion Detection Research community 
for conducting and evaluating proposed methodologies by the researchers.  
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Thesis Outline 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides the literature survey of 
the research topic and detailed back ground study. Chapter 3 describes our proposed 
methodology along with some technical and configuration issues. Simulation results and 
their analysis are presented in chapter 4. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes this thesis with 
future recommendations for further possible improvements. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Brief Introduction 
According to Siaterlis and Maglaris [2004] “data fusion is a process performed on 
multisource data towards detection, association, correlation, estimation and combination 
of several data streams into one with a higher level of abstraction and greater 
meaningfulness.” The process of collecting information from multiple possibly sources 
and combining them leads to more authentic and significant results. According to Bass 
[2000], multi sensor data fusion is a relatively new discipline that is used to “combine 
data from multiple and diverse sensors and sources in order to make inferences about 
events, activities and situations”. Bass [2000] states that this process can be compared to 
the human reasoning process where the brain receives various information from human 
body parts for evaluating their current state for making decision and to direct some 
specific actions. Bass [2000], Siaterlis and Maglaris [2004] [2005] give several examples 
that use data fusion in the real world. Bass [2000] claim that data fusion is widely used in 
military applications such as battlefield surveillance, tactical situation assessment and in 
commercial applications such as robotics, manufacturing, remote sensing and medical 
diagnosis. Military systems for threat assessment and weather forecast systems are the 
examples of such systems developed by Siaterlis and Maglaris [2004 and 2005] that are 
currently in use today. 
Most modern IDS use multiple intrusion sensors to maximize their reliability 
level. The process of multi sensor data fusion, also known as distributed sensing is used 
to combine data from multiple intrusion sensors and various output sources of the 
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network in order to make more informed decision about events, activities and situations. 
Input to a data fusion module of the IDS consists of various sensors output data, users’ 
commands, most of the time by system administrator and some other relevant data from 
the database through various data mining approaches. For example, the fusion system 
input could be the output data from various packet sniffers modules consisting of 
dedicated hardware and software, system log files, SNMP traps and queries, user profile 
databases, system messages and operator commands. The output of the data fusion 
module could be estimates of identity for a particular intruder, the various activities of an 
intruder, the location of an intruder, the observed threats, the attack rate and an 
assessment of the severity and strength of the cyber attack. 
Network Types 
Computer Networks are categorized based on their different sizes and network 
scalability. Selection among different network topologies also depends upon network 
type for sharing multiple information resources on the network. Some widely used 
network types are briefly discussed in following section.  
 
Wired Networks: In wired networks, systems are physically connected to each other. 
These networks are much secure and support huge data rates. Wired networks are also 
cheap in cost and much faster as compared to wireless networks. 
Wireless Networks: The simplest way to connect multiple devices is to use wireless 
networks. A wireless network uses radio waves for connection therefore the absence of 
physical media like wires makes this network much capable and easy to maintain. These 
types of networks are much slower and less secure than wired networks.   
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Infrastructure Networks: Infrastructure networks are the kind of a wireless network based 
on some infrastructure. It has servers and clients machines and is controlled by the main 
server. The whole network has a proper infrastructure and no other machine can enter the 
network without authentication and permission of the main server.  
Infrastructure-less Networks (Ad hoc Networks): There is no specific server client 
relationship among various systems of infrastructure-less network. Each system can act 
as a server or a client. Each device in this network is self organized and connection 
among them is wireless. This network type is further sub categorize into following two 
types. 
 
Static Ad hoc Networks: In a static ad hoc network, devices are not in continuous 
movement and they are connected among each other through a wireless network.   
Mobile Ad hoc Networks: According to Corson et al. [1999] “a mobile ad hoc network 
(MANET) is an autonomous system of mobile routers. It is very flexible network and 
deployment is easy as compare to static ad hoc network”. MANETs are suitable for 
emergency situations. This type of network is a relatively new innovation in the field of 
wireless network technology with new challenges and limitation. Various network 
operations are difficult to handle in a MANET because each node is independent and 
topologies change is very frequent. Reliable and efficient protocol is needed for smooth 
working of the mobile ad hoc network. A MANET consists of a set of communication 
devices able to indigenously interconnect without any pre existing infrastructure. The 
most challenging aspect in MANETs is communication of the devices within network 
range in point-to-point fashion and these devices are generally mobile. 
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Intrusion Detection System - IDS  
The real-time monitoring and analysis of various network activities for potential 
vulnerability is known as intrusion detection. IDS have become an important component 
in the security of any network. According to Thakar et al. [2005] “IDS tools aim to detect 
computer attacks and/or computer misuse and to alert the proper individuals, most of the 
time a system administrator, upon detection”. The IDS installed on a network serves the 
same purpose as a burglar alarm system installed in a house. Mainly IDS work in two 
modules, first when intruders or attackers are trying to enter in the network, secondly 
after they entered in the network. The IDS may be used with firewalls packages to 
enhance the network security and mainly to regulate the network traffic flow in and out 
of network. Firewalls and IDS are two different security tools and should never be 
considered the same.  
 
Active and Passive IDS: According to the www.dummies.com web site “an active IDS 
(now more commonly known as an intrusion prevention system — IPS) is a system that 
is configured to automatically block suspected attacks in progress without any 
intervention by an operator”. IPS is the main defense line for the intrusion that provides 
real-time response to an attack with in the network boundary. The main issue with an IPS 
is the vulnerability to cyber attack due to its activation within the network boundary.  
According to CISSP for Dummies page 406 “a passive IDS is a system that is configured 
only to monitor and analyze network traffic activity and alert an operator to potential 
vulnerabilities and attacks”. Unlike an IPS passive IDS only generate alerts relating to the 
network traffic. These IDS are not capable to take any decision on their own. 
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Development and deployment of these IDS are easy and quick compared to an IPS. These 
IDS are not vulnerable to intrusion because these systems mainly perform their role 
outside of the network. 
 
Network-Based and Host-Based IDS: According to Sree, Babu, Murty, Ramachandran 
and Devi [2008] “Network-based intrusion detection analyzes data packets that travel 
over the actual network. These packets are examined and sometimes compared with 
empirical data to verify their nature. Because they are responsible for monitoring a 
network, rather than a single host, Network-based IDSs (NIDS) tend to be more 
distributed than host-based IDS”. A network-based IDS has some network sensors 
connected with the network interface card working under unrestricted mode with their 
own management interface. The IDS monitors all data traffic within its boundary with the 
help of these network sensors.  
According to the CISSP for Dummies “A host-based IDS requires small programs (or 
agents) to be installed on individual systems to be monitored. The agents monitor the 
operating system and write data to log files and/or trigger alarms”. The host based IDS 
has limited surveillance to those host systems on which the agents are installed. Therefore 
entire network is not being monitored by host-based IDS. The very first type of IDS was 
the host based IDS. According to Sree et al. [2008] “these systems collect and analyze 
data that originate on a computer that hosts a service, such as a web server. Once this data 
is aggregated for a given computer, it can either be analyzed locally or sent to a 
separate/central analysis machine”. 
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Knowledge-Based and Behavior-Based IDS: According to the CISSP for Dummies “a 
knowledge-based (or signature-based) IDS references a database of previous attack 
profiles and known system vulnerabilities to identify active intrusion attempts. 
Knowledge-based IDS is currently more common than behavior-based IDS”. Knowledge-
based IDS has many advantages over other categories of IDS. Most significant is lower 
false alarm rate. The understandings of these output alarms are more easy and 
standardized. The knowledge based IDS is completely dependent on signature database. 
Therefore continuous update and maintenance is needed to detect new and unique attacks 
patterns.  
According to Desta [2007] “a behavior-based (or statistical anomaly–based) IDS 
references the baseline and learned pattern of normal system activity to identify active 
intrusion attempts. Deviations from this baseline or pattern cause an alarm to be 
triggered”. The behavior-based IDS generate more false alarms than knowledge based 
IDS but these IDS are easily and dynamically able to detect new attacks.  
Datasets available for experiments 
Researchers who have conducted experiments to demonstrate their proposed 
methodology for reducing false alarm rate have utilized various datasets in their research 
work. The DARPA DDoS intrusion detection evaluation datasets are popular choice 
among many IDS testers. It is no different when it came to testing the Dempster-Shafer 
IDS models. Yu and Frincke [2005] used the DARPA 2000 DDoS intrusion detection 
evaluation dataset to test their model. Chou et al. [2007] and [2008] used the DARPA 
KDD99 intrusion detection evaluation dataset. The KDD99 dataset can be found at 
http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html.  
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According to Chou et al. [2007], the DARPA KDD99 data set is made up of a large 
number of network traffic connections and each connection is represented with 41 
features. Further, each connection had a label of either normal or the attack type. They 
stated that the data set contained 39 attack types which fall into four main categories. 
They are, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), Probe, User to Root (U2R), and Remote 
to Local (R2L). The authors have reduced the size of the original data set by removing 
duplicate connections. They further modified the data set by replacing features 
represented by symbolic values and class labels by numeric values. Also, they normalized 
values of each feature to between 0 and 1 in order to offer equal importance among 
features. The 1998 DARPA intrusion detection evaluation data set was used by Katar 
[2006] for his experiments. Chen and Aickelin [2006] used the Wisconsin Breast cancer 
dataset and the Iris data set [Asuncion and Newman 2007] of the University of 
California, Irvine (UCI) machine learning repository for their research.  
Some authors chose to generate their own data for the attacks and background traffic. For 
example, Siaterlis et al. [2003] used background traffic generated from more than 4000 
computers in the National Technical University of Athens (NTUA) for their experiment. 
Various well known data sets used for experiments are mentioned in appendix D.  
We used DARPA 1999 evaluation in our research work that is the most preferred 
evaluation dataset used by researcher to evaluate their proposed methodology. Despite 
some criticism by IDS research community, especially Mahoney and Chan [2003] 
relating data gathering and further use of DARPA dataset in anomaly detector, the dataset 
still remains the top choice for the new researcher in the field of IDS. As mentioned 
earlier, the main objective of this research work is to explore the issue of huge false alarm 
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generation and address specific methods to minimize the negative effects of these false 
alarms.  
DARPA 1999 evaluation Dataset: It is difficult and very costly to perform reliable system 
evaluation for new IDS or new proposed methodology. The wide spread research in the 
field of IDS along with very high cost for development of these systems has led to a 
centralized idea to evaluate new IDS. DARPA consider most reliable and pioneer in this 
step by providing huge set of datasets to the research community.   Like 1998 evaluation, 
1999 evaluation dataset is also an off-line dataset. All critical points and issues raised in 
1998 evaluation dataset are addressed individually in 1999 evaluation dataset. 1999 
dataset covers more attack types than 1998 evaluation. Addition of Windows NT 
workstation as a victim and inside tcpdump sniffer machine also play significant role to 
make dataset type different from previous 1998 evaluation. New stealthy and inside 
attacks were design to include in 1999 evaluation in order to make network IDS 
evaluation more effective. 1999 evaluation dataset was designed mainly to detect the 
ability of new IDS for detecting more sophisticated distributed attacks without training 
the IDS on the instances of these new attacks.   
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Figure 1Main Operational Network for DARPA 1999 Dataset 
 (Adapted from 1999 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation: 
Design and Procedures. Haines et al [2001 page 18]) 
Computer attacks in DARPA 1999 evaluation dataset 
Computer attack is any malicious activity detected on any computer system. These 
attacks may include viruses, use of the system or its resources by any other unauthorized 
individual, probing of a system resources to get any unauthorized information, or any 
physical attack on computer hardware to interrupt the normal computer system. There are 
many ways that an attacker can either gain access to the system resources or stop the 
authorized user from gaining access of the system resources. The detailed attack 
instances for DARPA 1999 are mentioned in appendix E. 
Selection of Network Intrusion Detection Systems 
Normally, NIDS consists of five types of components including data collector, detector, 
user interface, storage and responder. Some NIDS perform these tasks in layers with 
addition of other supporting components. Detailed working and configuration of each 
NIDS is included in its documentation manual. We used Snort and Bro sensors for our 
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methodology test. A brief introduction of each of five major components of NIDS is 
mentioned, followed by some in depth knowledge of Snort and Bro NIDS used in this 
research work.   
 
Figure 2Components of General Intrusion Detection System 
(Adapted from Design Viable Intrusion Detection in High Performance Environments: 
Sommer [2005]) 
1) Collector 
Collector provides an interface for accessing data used in detection process. That could in 
ASCII or binary format. For most of the NIDS, network tap is default type of data 
collector. Network tap provides interface access to all network packets traveling on some 
particular position of a network. Some collectors provide access to external databases for 
detection process.  
2) Detector 
Most important component where actual detection process takes place could be name as 
the central processing unit of whole NIDS like brain to human body. Collector and 
Storage units provide all necessary data to Detector unit for deciding what events are 
actual alerts.  
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3) User Interface 
Provides output reports to the user and enable user to control NIDS. User interface is 
consisting of ASCII files and some complicated NIDS also provide graphical user 
interface.  
4) Storage 
Two types of data is saved in storage component. First, data may need by detector for 
further analysis and secondly for user interface to generate reports. This type of data is 
mainly provided by detector component and saved in database systems. Sometimes, user 
creates its own database as per requirements. 
5) Responder 
To save the system from an intrusion, NIDS reacts to the detected intrusions. Responder 
may actively respond to an intruder by dropping all connectivity with an attacker or 
connectivity within whole network depending on the severity of an attack.  
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Figure 3Working module for a typical Intrusion Detection System 
(Adapted from Design and Implementation of Intrusion Management: Alfaro  [2006 page 22]) 
  There is a wide range of NIDS available, and providing detailed overview of each 
NIDS is out of the scope of this thesis. Various NIDS are regularly evaluated by research 
community and computer network magazines. The most reputable research group that 
performs these tests on regular basis is NSS group [http://www.nsslabs.com]. Their 
reports are not freely available. Very brief introduction of some famous NIDS are 
mentioned in the table below followed by detailed overview for the two NIDS used in our 
thesis research work, Bro and Snort. 
Table 1 Well known Network Intrusion Detection Systems 
NIDS Brief introduction  
Bro A very exible open-source research system. It also provides the starting 
point for much of our work relating correlation and fusion technique. 
Hence, we again take a close look at its design along with Snort. 
Snort Probably the most-widely deployed NIDS. Snort is the de-facto standard 
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among open-source systems. This is used in our thesis work. Hence, we 
take a close look at its design and working. 
Emerald, 
STAT 
Two major research systems. They combine different detection approaches 
in a combined framework. While not purely network-based, they both 
contain major network-based components. While STAT is open-source, 
Emerald is not freely available. 
Dragon, 
IntruShield 
Two commercial NIDS developed by Enterasys Networks Inc. and 
McAfee Inc. respectively. These systems are purely network-based and are 
not available freely. 
 
Intrusion Detection System used for research work. 
Bro: Bro is widely used open source NIDS by research community. Vern Paxson is the 
main person behind the idea who developed Bro NIDS with his team. Compare to other 
NIDS, Bro is neither fully anomaly-based system nor a misused detection system. Bro 
has both capabilities, written in C++ under BSD-style license and is a Unix-based 
Network Intrusion Detection System. 
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Figure 4 Bro development over the years 
 (Adapted from Bro Workshop [2011]) 
 
According to Sommer [2005] Bros’ primary goal were 1) separation of mechanism and 
policy 2) efficiency operation suitable for high-volume network monitoring and 3) 
resistance to attacks directed at it. Bro works under real-time network analysis framework 
with low level detection capabilities. Bro works very well under high speed networks and 
emphasis on application-level semantics. Bro user need to specify what has to be detected 
by using very powerful Bro programming scripts. 
 
 
  
20 
 
Figure 5 Bro tap in the network 
 (Adapted from Bro Workshop [2011]) 
 
  Bro architecture consists of three main layers: packet filter, event generation and 
policy scripts execution. Packet filtering is done using a static BPF expression. Event 
generation layer generates events for various actions that take place within the network. 
For example, successful and unsuccessful user authentication, number of established 
connections, terminated connections, rejected connection and still alive connections. The 
user writes policy scripts using a high level language. These scripts contains event 
handler to deal with various events when they occur. Event handler could be program to 
response against an event. Event handler may also be program to update the data 
structure by sending out real time alerts against some event and same time executing 
some program to deal with the alert.  
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Figure 6 Bro layer architecture 
 (Adapted from Bro Workshop [2011]) 
 
Main advantages of Bro over the other NIDS are real-time network analysis beside 
intrusion detection, highly sophisticated and stateful that tracks extensive application-
layer network state, policy-neutral at the core that can accommodate a range of detection 
approaches and supports wide range of forensic analysis by saving huge logs files on the 
network. Bro is mainly command line based and fully customizable that adds more power 
to its adoptability beside more than 20,000 lines of script prewritten functionality that can 
just be loaded. These prewritten scripts are responsible to generate logs and alarms as per 
user demand and requirements. Bro has some challenges when working on huge clusters. 
Mainly these challenges include communication capability and management of multi-
machine setup. These challenges make setup tedious and complex. Bro system lacks 
proper documentations and functionality polishing that further upgrades the complexity 
level for some security experts.  Currently NSF (National Science Foundation) is funding 
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Bro development team to tackle these issues by working on user experience and 
performance feed backs.  
Bro is a fully distributed system and analyze the network connections to support almost 
all type of connections including TCP, UDP and ICMP. These connections types known 
as connections semantics are interpreted by analyzer through extracting basic semantic 
protocols elements and generating relating network events. Analyzer consists of two main 
components i.e. policy-neutral analysis and secondly policy script component that has 
various policy-specific actions. Analyzers can interact with wide range of protocols 
including HTTP, FTP, TCP, SMTP, DNS SSL and many more. Some analyzers are 
protocol independent for detecting scanning, stepping stones and backdoor attacks. Single 
line ASCII summary is generated by connection analyzer for each connection the system 
detects. 
 
 
Figure 7 Various frame work of Bro NIDS 
(Adapted from Bro web site) 
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Bro resists attacks against itself. Bro detection mechanism and all other documentations 
are public except the system core parameters in order to keep the Bro save from intrusion. 
Bro is a policy-neutral research system that provides huge flexibility to perform various 
experiments on different parameters in order to evaluate capabilities of new security 
policies. Therefore we carried out our work by using this highly sophisticated Network  
 
Snort: Snort is highly sophisticated and widely acceptable open source network based 
IDS in computer networks intrusion research community. Snort uses signature detection 
method by sniffing network packets and afterward examining that data for the contents 
that matches known attacks. Snort was developed by Martin Roesch in 1998 and later by 
Sourcefire (http://www.sourcefire.com) a well know network Security Company based in 
USA. Snort is capable of performing real time traffic analysis with all capabilities that 
Bro NIDS capable of, like protocol analysis, events generations and saving the log files 
for further analysis. According to the Snort website, it can be used as straight packet 
sniffer like tcpdump, a packet logger or as a full blown network IDS. 
Snort is logically divided into many components with different functionalities. The major 
components are 1) Packet Decoder that takes packets from different types of network 
interfaces and send them to detection engine for further process. 2) Preprocessors that 
modify the data before the detection engine perform some security operations in order to 
detect alerts. In other worlds, preprocessors are plug-ins that may find anomalies in 
packet headers. Snort Preprocessors has the ability to defragment the network packet, 
decode HTTP URI and reassembly various packet streams. 3) Detection Engine is like a 
brain to the Snort that is the most important and core part of NIDS. Detection Engine is 
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responsible to detect any intrusion activity within network packets. The processing power 
of Snort detection engine is directly link with the system power where the Snort is 
installed. Various Snort detection engine may take different amount of time to detect and 
response the network attacks. Detection engine’s processing power mainly depends upon 
the number of loaded rules, machine power, network speed and network load.  
 
 
Figure 8 Various components of Snort NIDS 
(Adapted from Snort user manual [July 2011]) 
 
4) Logging and Alerting System is another major component of Snort that creates various 
log files depending on the events detected by detection engine. Logs are kept in simple 
text files or tcp-dump format and may need further manipulation in order to apply various 
correlation rules. 5) Output Modules specify the format to save the output generated by 
logging and alerting system of Snort. Output modules may simply alerts in specified 
location, sending SNMP traps, sending messages to syslog facility, logging alerts in some 
database systems like MySQL or Oracle and generating XML output 
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Snort is being supported on number of hardware platforms and operating systems like 
Linux, OpenBSD, FreeBSD, NetBSD, Solaris, HP-UX, AIX, IRIX, MacOS and 
Windows. Like Bro, Snort also protects itself from intrusion.  
 
 
Figure 9 Snort in stealth mode to protect from outside attack 
(Adapted from Advance Intrusion Techniques Rehman [2003]) 
 
User may run Snort in stealth mode for listening incoming traffic in order to hide its 
existence. Snort could be run without any IP address interface for keeping its identity 
hidden. Snort NIDS is well documented and several third-part tools provide interfacing 
bridge with Snort for administration tasks. Well known third party tools are Snorby (open 
source), BASE (open source), Sourcefile (commercial) and Aanval (commercial). Snort 
is most widely deployed NIDS worldwide with millions of downloads and over 400,000 
registered users. That’s why we selected Snort NIDS for our second open source sensor 
to carry out our research.    
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Standardized efforts for representing alerts in IDS - IDMEF  
Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) defines common data formats 
and exchange procedures for sharing information among IDS and response systems. The 
Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) is a standard format (RFC 
4765) developed by Curry and Debar in the Intrusion Detection Working Group (IDWG) 
[www.izerv.net/idwg-public] 
 
 
Figure 10 IDMEF data model 
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IDMEF manage different systems need to interact with IDS. In other words, IDMEF is a 
standard data format for alert representation used by various IDS for reporting various 
detected suspicious events. According to Debar et al. [2007], “the most obvious place to 
implement the IDMEF is in the data channel between an intrusion detection analyzer (or 
“sensor) and the manger (or “consol”) to which it sends alarms.”  
The data stores in databases though many IDS in the form of IDMEF makes data 
analyzer (security administrator) able to decide about the system state more effetely on 
the basis of whole network picture instead of just a part of it. Another huge advantage of 
IDMEF is during the process of correlation, where various types of data though different 
sensors are cross-correlated based on some common calculating means. IDMEF also 
enables the data representation more easy to understand and more towards centralized 
interface. Data communication among various organizations and security agencies is also 
more effective and in more efficient way due to the implementation of IDMEF by them. 
IDMEF also has some limits. For example two or more IDS may name the same alert 
type differently due to limited capability of IDMEF in semantic representation. This issue 
further adds complexity in creating an equivalent object oriented representation of the 
same event in relational database such as MySQL.  
Alert Management Techniques 
After deploying IDS, alert handling is the next step. The challenge of IDS is not only 
detecting intrusions but also by managing alerts. Reducing the large number of alerts is 
known as alert management. Alert management techniques can be divided into two 
general classes:  
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Low-level alert management: According to the Alsubhi [2008] “the low-level alert 
operations deal with each alert individually to enrich its attributes or assign scores based 
on potential risk”.  
 
High-level alert management: According to the Alsubhi [2008] “high-level alert 
management techniques, such as aggregation, clustering, correlation, and fusion, deals 
with a set of alerts and provide an abstraction of these alerts. High-level techniques will 
improve their outcomes due to the early low-level evaluation steps”. Various alert 
management techniques deals with huge number of unrelated alerts during the managing 
process that leads toward inaccurate final result for the IDS fusion process. 
 
 
Figure 11 Various Alert Management techniques 
(Adapted from A Fuzzy-logic based alert prioritization engine: 
Alsubhi [2008]) 
Brief descriptions of the main alert management techniques are as follows: 
Alert Reduction: Alert reduction is a very important technique that is done either before 
IDS generates alerts or afterwards. According to Alsubhi [2008] “alert reduction 
techniques includes alert aggregation technique, try to group a set of alerts together that 
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have some common characteristic, such as the source, the target and the type of the 
attack”. The other important technique is Alert merging technique that combines all alerts 
in one single alert representation form to present an abstract view of the generated alerts. 
Alerts with common features such as IP addresses of the machines, their ports or domain 
name are grouped in alert clustering technique.  
 
Alert Correlation: An alert correlation process discovers connection between various 
series of security events. To achieve the final goal, most of the time, intruders launch 
their attack in a series of steps. Traditional IDS are unable to detect these complex attacks 
series and deal with each small attack as an individual attack without correlating with 
other attacks. As a result, the IDS  generates huge number of alerts and false positives 
making the analysis process more difficult for network administrator. Most of the time, 
alert correlation process eliminates huge number of false alarms.  
 
Alert Visualization: Each alert has many related fields, for example the IP address for 
attack generated machine, the IP address for the target machine, domain name, port 
number, time stamps and many other related information. This information is shown to 
the network administrator in the best understandable and visual format. Simply by 
looking at alert records, it is difficult for the network administrator to make a decision 
without understanding completely what these alerts are addressing. Alert visualization 
helps network administrator to understand overall picture of network states.  
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Data Fusion Process for IDS 
The main goal of the alert fusion process is to fix the problems of IDS that include 
generation of large number of alerts, large number of false positives, large number of 
non-relevant positives and alerts that do not contain enough information about their 
attributes. Alert fusion process not only fixes the problems of particular IDS but also 
process the output of other sensors to find the high-level of attack pattern by performing 
the process of alert prioritization. According to Helney et al. [2010] “data fusion is a 
formal framework in which are expressed means and tools for the alliance of data 
originating from different sources. It aims at obtaining information of greater quality; the 
exact definition of `greater quality' will depend upon the application.” 
Multi-Sensor Data Fusion: Around 1970, the first data fusion method was in the military 
domain for example in surface to air or air to air defense, various surveillance purposes, 
intelligent gathering for various warning, and defense systems in the battlefield. Later this 
process was also applied to civilian domains for example robotic engineering, automotive 
industry, manufacturing industry, medical applications and various construction sites. 
According to the Bass [2000] a more recent idea is the application of multi-sensor data 
fusion techniques to the area of information security. 
 
Data Fusion Architecture: A basic and important aspect of a data fusion system is the 
selection of the architecture for developing the fusion system. Hall [1992] as well as Hall 
and Llinas [1997] describe three architectural approaches to the data fusion architecture 
model. According to Boer [2002] “the first approach involves the fusion of raw sensor 
data, and is called centralized fusion (with raw data), or data level fusion” (see figure 
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below). This method requires more bandwidth because all sensors data is required to 
transfer to central processing facility for the fusion process to start. It is important that all 
sensors in the network have equal capability and level of expertise.  
 
Figure 12 Data Level Fusion Approach 
(Adapted from Hall [1992], Llinas [1997] page 17) 
 
According to Boer [2002] “another possible architecture is centralized fusion with feature 
vector data (see figure below). This is also called feature level fusion. In this architecture, 
feature vectors rather than raw data are transmitted to the central fusion process”. Sensors 
extract these vectors from the raw data. These feature vectors are refined representation 
of the raw data that results in some data lose. Because of the data lose in feature fusion 
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model during conversion of vector data from raw data, less bandwidth is require as 
compare to the data level fusion approach to transfer data to the central fusion facility. 
 
Figure 13 Feature Level Fusion Approach 
(Adapted from Hall [1992], Llinas [1997] page 19) 
 
The next fusion level model is known as decision level fusion approach model (see 
Figure below). In this approach sensors makes decision based their source data. This 
decision result of sensors goes into the fusion process for further refine fusion. This 
approach also deals with significant low volume of data transfer and requires less 
bandwidth as compare to previous two approaches. 
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Figure 14 Decision Level Fusion Approach 
(Adapted from Hall [1992], Llinas [1997] page 22) 
 
The selection of right approach is purely depends on the requirements and various 
constraints, for example type of sensors and available bandwidth. Each architecture has 
some advantages and disadvantage over the others 
Fusion-Based IDS 
The main purpose of fusion-based IDS is to keep the network operators up to date 
relating to the current information of the network state. This information mainly relates to 
attacks, intruders and relationship among them. Fusion based IDS perform this task with 
greater quality than traditional non fusion based IDS. The success rate of a fusion based 
IDS is completely based on its multiple sensors and multiple levels of fusion processes 
known as abstraction levels. According to Blasch and Plano [2002] “the multiple levels 
of abstraction are supported by the Joint Director of Labs (JDL) [1999] data fusion 
model”. Five more levels were introduced in 2002 by JDL. According to Basch and Plano 
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[2002] level 0 is for preprocessing, level 1 for object refinement, level 2 for situation 
refinement, level 3 for threat refinement, and level 4 for process refinement.  
This means that the JDL model [2002] is applicable to intrusion detection. At each of the 
levels of the JDL model, functionality of fusion-based IDS can be identified. Filtration 
process is done at level 0. Unimportant and nonrelated are filtered out after series of 
events. These series of events generates alerts. These alerts are transferred to Level 1 
fusion of JDL model. In level 1 these alerts combine on the basis on their similarities 
(alerts generated on the same event) and categorize in to groups. These groups of alerts 
are called alert tracks. Identity estimate process is done on each alert track by the process 
of fusion. On level 2 of JDL fusion model, reasoning process is applied in order to find 
the various categories of attacks and attackers (intruders) on the alert tracks. Threat 
assessment of current situation is done during level 3. Threat assessment of an attack and 
attacker is asses during this level. Level 4 generates the final output result after refining 
the threat assessment in an improved version after considering some additional external 
factors.   
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Figure 15 JDL Revised Model Data Level Fusion Approach 
(Adapted from Blaschl E and Plano S [2002], page 2) 
 
According to Valdes et al. [2001] “the probabilistic approach is used when a similarity 
function is defined for each attribute”. Similarity function plays a vital role for 
controlling huge number of alerts. The overall similarity of alerts is calculating by 
applying similarity function using an expectation of similarity. According to Valdes et al. 
[2001] “the method considers appropriate fields in alert reports as features for matching 
algorithm. For each new alert, algorithm computes similarity to existing meta alerts, and 
merge the new alert with the best matching meta alert, as long as the match passes a 
threshold value”.  
Gula [2002] suggested a solution for preventing and reducing false positive alert by 
correlating IDS alert with vulnerability of that particular system. At a high level, if IDS 
knows that a system is vulnerable to a particular vulnerability, then it should only 
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concern itself with attacks against that particular vulnerability. According to the author, 
this alert fusion approach makes better decisions through an automated fashion.  
According to the Burroughs [2002], network system should be secure and defended 
against attacker not the attack itself. To secure the system from an attacker, the intrusion 
detection is needed to be performed from an attacker’s central viewpoint. According to 
Burroughs, central view point idea ignores the core issue of possibility of coordinated 
attack effort among separate attackers against a network. 
  Chaitanya Kumar [2003] explains another approach to handle false alarm through 
fusion process. He introduced E-IDS Data Collector that obtained input (alerts) from 
sensors, logs and device logs and perform multiple steps to reduce alert flooding and 
false positive.  
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Figure 16 IDS Data Fusion Model – an implementation approach 
(Adapted from Bassl [2000], page 14) 
 
Probability Theory 
Probability theory is branch of mathematics concerns with probability, the analysis of 
random formulas. Random variable and events are main inputs for any probability theory. 
This theory is very helpful to determine the non-deterministic events over time interval in 
random fashion. These random events repetition- occurrence lead towards evidence for 
certain patterns of occurrence. After detailed analysis, evidence helps for predicting 
random events occurrences. Probability theory is very helpful for partial knowledge 
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systems in order to describe the system state. Probability theory deals with events occur 
in countable time intervals, is known as discrete probability distribution theory. 
Continuous probability theory deals with events that occur in continuous time.  
 
Detective logic: Detective logic creates arguments based on necessary hypotheses within 
set of premises. Premise is a statement about any argument based on rules of inference or 
symbolic logic for justifying the conclusion. Detective logic or reasoning considers being 
a sound reasoning if it is a valid reasoning argument and its premises are true.   
 
Probability Logic: Probability logic handles uncertainty factor by combination of 
probability theory capacity with detective logic capacity. Probability logic is based on 
very complex formulas that further enhance computational complexity of probability and 
logical calculations. Various proposals are available to deal with these complex systems. 
There are two main classes of these proposals. One deals with probabilistic extension to 
logical entailment and other deals with uncertainty and lack of evidence.  
 
Subjective logic: Subjective logic is a type of probability logic that deals with uncertainty 
and incomplete knowledge for any situation. Subjective logic works on opinion known as 
subjective opinion about any proposition. There are two types of opinions, one is 
binomial opinion applies to single preposition and represent as beta distribution. Other 
type of opinion is known as multinomial opinion represent as dirichlet distribution. 
Subjective logic has two types of subjective operators, standard operators and non 
standard operators. Belief in any proposition is subjective.  Subjective opinion expresses 
  
39 
subjective belief relating the correctness of any proposition with degree of uncertainty. 
Proposition is content or meaning of any sentence. In mathematical form proposition is a 
combination of symbols and variable that make a meaningful declarative formula.   
 
Uncertainty types: Uncertainty is the base of complex computational analysis that results 
in advancement of various fields of science. By handling uncertainty factor more 
efficiently, system becomes more accurate and effective. According to Helton [1997], 
uncertainty has two major types. Aleatory uncertainty results from the fact that a system 
can behave in a random way. Aleatory uncertainty is also known as Type A uncertainty, 
Irreducible uncertainty or objective uncertainty. The other type of uncertainty, known as 
Epistemic uncertainty results from the lack of knowledge about the system parameters. 
More in depth analysis needed for Epistemic uncertainty which is also known as Type B 
uncertainty, Reducible uncertainty, Subjective uncertainty or Ignorance. 
 Traditional probability theories can handle both uncertainty types. Application of 
traditional probability theories for Epistemic or Subjective uncertainty is known as 
Bayesian probability. In probabilistic analysis, analyst knows the exact probability of 
each event occurrence. When it is not available, Principle of Insufficient Reason is used 
to represent probability of un known events.  
 
Types of Evidence: Combination of evidence from multiple sources has two major issues 
to deal with. One is the type of evidence involved and the other is to deal with conflicting 
evidence. The combination of evidence is based on various types of the evidence 
involved in the system‘s situation analysis. These types are consonant evidence (nested 
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structure), consistent evidence (at least one element is common to all subsets), arbitrary 
evidence (no element is common to all subsets) and disjoint evidence (any two subsets 
have no element in common).  
Dempster Shafer Theory -DST 
Dempster Shafer Theory (DST) is a mathematical theory of evidence. Initially Dempster 
[1967] provide the theory and later Shafer [1976] provide the extension of Dempster’s 
work in more effective and influential way. In a finite discrete space, DST is a 
generalization of probability theory where different probabilities are being assigned to 
various sets of events unlike single possible event in traditional probability theories. 
Therefore, evidence in DST is more meaningful at higher level of abstraction. DST has 
three main functions to deal with uncertainty. One is basic probability assignment known 
as bpa or m. Secondly, the Belief function (Bel) and lastly, the Plausibility function (Pl). 
Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence is more general form of Bayesian theory that also 
deals with probability factor of an event that requires probability of each step for leading 
towards an event. Belief function is used in Bayesian theory that leads to various 
questions of interests like these degrees of belief may or may not have the mathematical 
properties of probabilities. The closeness of two related questions decides the difference 
of probability factor among them. According to Glenn Shafer [1976], subsequent work 
has made clear that the management of uncertainty inherently requires more structure 
than is available in simple rule-based systems, but the Dempster-Shafer theory remains 
attractive because of its relative flexibility.  
The Dempster-Shafer theory works in two main steps. In first step the degree of belief for 
one question is gathered from subjective probabilities for a related question. In second 
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step the, Dempster’s rule of combining is applied on these related questions on the basis 
of their probability factors. The Dempster-Shafer theory is mainly theory of reasoning in 
order to reach a final decision. The implementation of Dempster-Shafer theory involves 
the solution of two related problems. First, sorting the uncertainties factors of the 
problem into an independent item. Second, carry out Dempster’s rule computationally. 
Sorting the uncertainties into independent items leads to a structure involving items of 
evidence that influence by different but related questions, and this structure can be used 
to make computations feasible.  
Motivation for choosing Dempster-Shafer theory  
A major advantage of Dempster Shafer theory over other approaches is narrowing down 
the hypothesis set with the accumulation of evidence. In Intrusion Detection 
environment, Dempster Shafer theory is useful for combing the evidence provided by 
different observers. These observers could even be completely different and located 
remotely from each other. Each observer could provide its own perceived state to a 
central server which will combine the evidence to determine the final state of the 
network. The most important part of the theory is Dempster’s rule of combination is 
combining the evidence from two or more sources to form inferences. Various 
researchers discussed the advantages of D – S theory of evidence in their work. Some of 
them are discussed below. 
According to Siaterlis et al. [2003], and Siaterlis and Maglaris [2004 and 2005], the 
Dempster-Shafer theory approach has significant advantages over the Bayesian approach. 
They state that in contrast to the Bayesian approach where one can only assign 
probabilities to single elements of the Frame of Discernment-FoD (Θ), the Dempster-
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Shafer theory can assign probabilities to the states (elements) of the power set of Θ. 
Another advantage according to the authors is that Dempster-Shafer theory calculates the 
probability of the evidence supporting a hypothesis rather than calculating the probability 
of the hypothesis itself unlike the traditional probabilistic approach. Also, they say that 
Dempster-Shafer theory has a definite advantage in a vague and unknown environment.  
According to Chen and Venkataramanan [2005] the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence 
provides a mathematical way to combine evidence from multiple observers without the 
need to know about a priori or conditional probabilities as in the Bayesian approach. 
According to Chen and Aickelin [2006], Dempster-Shafer theory is very well suited for 
anomaly detection because it does not require any prior knowledge. Another advantage of 
Dempster-Shafer theory according to Chen and Aickelin is that it can express a value of 
ignorance, giving information on the uncertainty of a situation. They state that Bayesian 
inference requires a priori knowledge and does not allow allocating probability to 
ignorance. So, the authors stated that, in their opinion, Bayesian approach is not always 
suitable for anomaly detection because prior knowledge may not always be provided. 
Especially, in casewhere the aim of anomaly detection is to discover previously unseen 
attacks, a system that relies on existing knowledge cannot be used. 
According to Chatzigiannakis et al. [2007] the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence has a 
clear advantage in an unknown environment when compared to inference processes like 
first order logic that assumes complete and consistent knowledge. They also stated that 
the Dempster-Shafer theory has an advantage when compared to probability theory which 
requires knowledge in terms of probability distributions. 
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Specifically relating to our research work, Dempster-Shafer method is a powerful tool 
that can deal with subject hypothesis for the evidence as well as statistical data 
combination. It is much like a voting mechanism. It does not have the requirement like 
Bayesian that the various sensor set be predefined and sensor’s join observation 
probability distribution be known beforehand.  
 
Disadvantages of D – S Theory: Various researchers discussed curtain disadvantages of D 
– S theory of evidence in their work. According to Siaterlis et al. [2003], Siaterlis and 
Maglaris [2004] and [2005], and Chatzigiannakis et al. [2007], the main disadvantage of 
the Dempster-Shafer theory is the assumption it makes, that the pieces of evidence is 
statistically independent from each other. Since sources of information are often linked 
with some sort of dependence in real life situations, this assumption does not always hold 
true. According to Siaterlis et al. [2003], Dempster-Shafer theory based system is unable 
to detect multiple simultaneous attacks because of consideration of mutually exclusive set 
of system states. 
According to Chen and Aickelin [2006], Dempster-Shafer theory has two major 
problems. One is the computational complexity associated with Dempster-Shafer theory. 
The other is the management of conflicting beliefs. According to Chen and Aickelin the 
computational complexity of Dempster-Shafer theory increases exponentially with the 
number of elements in the frame of discernment. If there are n elements in frame of 
discernment set, there will be up to 2
n
-1 focal elements that need to be check for any 
mass function like probability factor. Further the combination of two mass functions 
needs the computation of up to 2
n
 intersections. 
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Mathematics Computation for D – S Theory 
The Frame of Discernment (θ): A complete (exhaustive) set describing all of the sets or 
states of a given system in the hypothesis space. Exactly one of them is true at a time. 
Generally, the frame is denoted as θ. The elements in the frame must be mutually 
exclusive. If the number of the elements in the set is n, then the power set (set of all 
subsets of (θ) will have 2n elements. 
 
Basic Probability Assignment (bpa): The Dempster-Shafer theory uses a number in the 
range [0, 1] to indicate the belief in a hypothesis given a piece of evidence. This number 
shows the degree to which the evidence supports the hypothesis. The impact of evidence 
on the subset θ is represented by the function called basic probability assignment (bpa). 
In other word, the basic probability assignment (bpa) represents by m defines the 
mapping of the power set to the interval between 0 and 1. The bpa to the null set is 0 and 
the summation of the bpa’s of all subsets of the power set is 1. The bpa of any particular 
set A which is a subset of power set, represents all relevant and available evidence that 
supports the claim of particular element of X (known as universal set) belongs to the set 
A but not the subset of A. In other words, the value of m(A) only claims about the set A 
but not the subset of A. Any further evidence for subset of A would be represented in 
another bpa function.  
 .......... (1) 
.......... (2) 
 .......... (3) 
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Belief and Plausibility: From the bpa assignment, upper and lower bounds of an interval 
can be defined. This interval contains the precise probability of the set of interest. The 
interval is bound by two measures knows as Belief and Plausibility. The lower bound 
Belief is defined for any set A, the subset of universal set X, as the sum of all the basic 
probability assignments (bpa) of the proper subset B of the set of interest A. 
 
Figure 17 Confidence interval between "belief' and "plausibility" 
(Adopted from Wu [2003]) 
  The upper bound Plausibility for the set A, the subset of the universal set X,  is 
the sum of all the basic probability assignments (bpa) of the set of B, the proposer subset 
of A, that interest the set of interest A.  
 .......... (4) 
 .......... (5) 
It is possible to obtain the bpa from the Belief measure with the following inverse 
function 
 .......... (6) 
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Where | A – B | is the difference f the cardinality of the two sets. Basic Probability must 
sum to 1. The two bounded measures, Belief and Plausibility can be drive from each 
other in the following way. 
 .......... (7) 
Where   is the classical component of A.  
 .......... (8) 
 .......... (9) 
From equation 6 and 7, given any one parameter measure among m(A), Bel(A) or Pl(A), 
it is possible to drive the other two. The exact probability of any event lies with the lower 
and upper bounds of Belief and Plausibility.  
 .......... (10) 
Rules for the Combination of Evidence 
Multiple sources present different assessment of the same frame of discernment. 
Dempster Shafer Theory assumes that these sources are independent. From the set theory 
stand point, rules for the combination of evidence from different sources combine based 
on either conjunction or disjunction rules. Among the independent sources, if only one 
source is reliable source, we can justify the use of disjunction combination rules (OR-
based on set union). On the other hand, where all sources are considered equally reliable, 
we can justify the use of conjunction combination rules (AND-based on set intersection). 
According to Doubious and Prade [1992], there are three types of combination, 
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conjunctive pooling, disjunctive pooling and a tradeoff. Various operators are available 
for each combination pooling to combine the data based on some algebraic properties. 
There are multiple possible ways to combine the evidence in Dempster Shafer Theory. 
Some combination rules beside Dempster rule of combination are Yager’s rule, Inagaki’s 
unified combination rule, Zhang’s center combination rule and Doubios and Prade’s 
disjunctive pooling rule. We will discuss Dempster’s rule of Combination in detail.  
 
The Dempster Rule of Combination: Basic probability assignment (m) plays vital role in 
Dempster’s combination rule where multiple belief functions combines based on there 
bpa (m). These belief functions are based on the independent argument (evidence) for the 
same frame of discernment. According to Shafer [1986,p.132] the Dempster’s 
combination rule is purely a conjunction pooled operation (AND). Dempster’s 
combination rule combines two bpa’s   and  in the following manners.  
 .......... (11) 
 .......... (12) 
 .......... (13) 
K represents basic probability mass associated with conflict and determined by the 
summing the products of the bpa’s of all set with null intersection among them.  The 
denominator 1-K is a normalization factor use to address the conflicting evidence, its 
probability mass and Dempster’s rule. 
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Subjective Logic Theory  
As mentioned before, various IDS development methods are based on anomaly or misuse 
techniques. These techniques and input data along with various configuration parameters 
of sensors create the system with different degrees of strength and weaknesses. In 
uncertain environment fuzzy logic, neural network and subjective logic are the most 
promising candidates for dealing with intrusion alarms. Each technique has its merits for 
improving the accuracy of detection mechanism. We used subjective logic that is a 
framework for artificial reasoning based on belief theory. Belief theory known as 
Dempster-Shafer theory was introduced as a framework for upper and lower probability 
bounds and a mathematical theory of evidence. According to Jøsang [1999] Classical 
Dempster-Shafer Theory suffers from the lack of traditional logical operators such as 
AND and OR. Subjective logic seems very suitable for reasoning about the intrusion 
detection attacks because an attack can be consider to be a crisp event, i.e. an attack 
either takes place or not. Mover over in our case, belief about intrusion reported by any 
sensor can have varying degree of certainty.  
Opinion is the central concept of Jøsang’s subjective logic theory. According to Jøsang 
[1999], let θ be a frame of discernment, and let  be a Belief Mass Assignment (BMA) 
on θ. An opinion  on the binary frame of discernment θ with two atomic states  and 
(  is define as  
) .......... (14) 
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, ,  and represents belief, disbelief, uncertainty and atomicity functions on  
in  respectively.  
The belief function  corresponding with  is the function  defined by:  
,   .......... (15) 
The disbelief function  corresponding with  is the function  defined 
by:  
,   .......... (16) 
The uncertainty function  corresponding with  is the function  
defined by:  
,   .......... (17) 
The relative atomicity function  of  corresponding with  is the function 
 defined by:  
,   .......... (18) 
The sum of the belief, disbelief and uncertainty function is equal to the sum of the belief 
mass in a BMA, equal to 1 according to following definition  
   .......... (19) 
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The basic concept of opinion was initially introduced in Dempster’s paper in 1967 and 
more refined form was introduced by Jøsang in his 1999 paper. Opinion can be presented 
in an opinion triangle as shown in the following figure. 
 
Figure 18 Jøsang's opinion triangle 
(Adopted from Haenni [2005]) 
This triangle was extensively used by Jøsang to represent the opinion space known as 
opinion triangle. Initially the same concept was introduced by Dempster and he named 
the concept as a mathematical term barycentric coordinates. According to Jøsang [1999], 
every opinion corresponds to a normal mass function  on θ with 
. These relations create a 
connection between Dempster Shafer theory and Jøsang theory. Most of the researchers 
believe that Jøsang Subjective Logic is an enhanced special case of applying Dempster’s 
Rule for the mass functions particularly conjunctions, disjunctions and negations but not 
for the consensus operators.  
The Consensus Operator 
According to Jøsang [1999], the consensus opinion of two possible conflicting argument 
opinions is an opinion that reflects both argument opinions in a fair and equal way. When 
two different observers have different beliefs about the truth of x based on different 
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evidence about x, the consensus operator produce a consensus belief that combines the 
two separate beliefs into one. 
Let  , ,  ,  ) and  , ,  ,  ) be opinions respectively 
held by agents A and B about the same state x, and let . 
When  0, the relative dogmatism between  and is defined by   so that 
 . Let  , ,  ,  )be the opinion such that : 
 
 ) / K .......... (20) 
= ( + ) / K .......... (21) 
) / k .......... (22) 
=  ) /  .......... (23) 
= (  + )/ 2 When = = 1 .......... (24) 
 
 ) / .......... (25) 
 ) / .......... (26) 
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 = 0 .......... (27) 
( 1 .......... (28) 
Then  is called the consensus opinion between and representing an 
imaginary agent [A, B]’s opinion about x. The mapping between the Evidence and 
Opinion Space can be drawn though following propositional expression where u ≠ 0 and 
C is a constant value. 
 .......... (29) 
 .......... (30) 
 .......... (31) 
Where parameter b represents belief, d is disbelief, u is uncertainty, r represents the 
amount of evidence supporting the actual event and s represents the amount of evidence 
supporting its negative.  
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CHAPTER III 
DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter, we present our proposed methodology with detailed architecture and 
various operating principles. We discuss in-depth analysis for each step and its impact on 
local and final output with some necessary arguments based on proven theorems and 
methodologies. We also provide different algorithms and pseudocode for each major 
independent module.  
First we generally explain our proposed architecture and how it works. In next section, 
we will analyze our approach by describing different metrics used as standard 
preprocessing against every sensor’s output. Multilevel correlation and fusion approaches 
are discussed and analyzed in next sections. As we discussed earlier in chapter 2, there 
are different approaches to minimize the false alarms rate, we will discuss how our 
approach is different from those and how shortcomings of earlier approaches are 
addressed in our proposed methodology. 
Sensor output and Data Collection 
IDS perform their network sniffing same time on different network locations. Therefore, 
their output might be different among themselves depending on the nature of traffic they 
are scanning. The nature of output data from each sensor completely depends on the 
internal processing of a particular sensor. After installing and configuring each sensor, 
their tap location should be carefully selected in order to maximize their utilization.  
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Figure 19 Proposed Architecture for Alert Reduction 
 
Separate database was created for each sensor individually to minimize the possibility of 
output data lose generated through each sensor. Following are some basic steps for Data 
Collection.  
 Select location for sensor installation 
 Install and configure sensors based on security requirements 
 Create individual database for each sensor 
 Connect the database engine with sensor’s output module 
Alert Normalization  
The correlation and fusion module receives alerts from different sensors. As mentioned 
earlier, different IDS use different format and attributes for alert representation. The basic 
purpose of this module is to translate every output alert from each sensor, into a common 
alert representation format with common representing fields. This common representation 
format is very important for understanding various semantics of each sensor by 
 55 
correlation and fusion modules. Most of the IDS use Intrusion Detection Message 
Exchange Format (IDMEF) for their final alert output. Various IDS use different name 
for the same type of event or most of the time different fields for representing same 
event. Snort IDS uses well defined fields for an event representation. We followed Snort 
field set as our standard alert representation. Some sensors generate very detailed alert 
representation and might be helpful for further analysis. For this purpose, we create 
separate database for each sensor. 
Our Normalization database engine is based on Snort IDS format as a standardized alert 
format for naming various alerts fields. All the alerts from different IDS are copied to the 
appropriate fields in order to adopt stand format. This scheme provides basic frame work 
for next alert reduction schemes especially multilevel correlation.  
 Extract detail of each field represented in sensor output report 
 Compare them with Snort sensor standard fields 
 Create fields for new sensor output according to Snort format 
 Copy all appropriate fields of selected sensor that match with Snort 
representation fields 
As mentioned earlier, we used Snort standard formatting and naming convention, there 
are some available schemes for naming convention. Most of the researcher used Common 
Vulnerability and Exposure (CVE) naming scheme for sensors output. According to CVE 
web site, CVE provides a list of information security vulnerabilities which is free to use. 
The prime goal of CVE is to make it easier to share data across separate vulnerability 
capabilities tools. According to Snort official web site, some Snort signatures and Snort 
rules have CVE field’s specification.  
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Various sensors don’t follow IDMEF scheme. For this purpose, simple unification 
format is an option for correlation and fusion processes, in case those sensors are selected 
for data sniffing. Following table describe some general fields used for unification alert 
format scheme.  
Table 2 Unification alert format 
Field Name Description 
analyzerID Intrusion detection system ID 
alerted Alert ID 
alertType Class of alert 
srcIP Source IP address of alert 
dstIP Destination IP address of alert 
srcPort Source port of the alert 
dstPort Destination port of alert 
alertTime Alert time stamp 
alertInfo Alert information and additional description 
 
Alert Preprocessing  
Sensors generate multiple information for any detected event during network sniffing. 
Most of the time, the information in different fields is not in a standard format. This non 
standard information is difficult to understand by correlation and fusion processes. For 
example, Bro use UNIX time stamp and numeric IP address that could not be used for 
further alert reduction schemes without conversion. In our Alert Preprocessing module, 
all data representation formatting schemes for various sensors are being examined. If 
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needed, further processing and conversion is done on the final output in order to achieve 
standard format for each field in the sensor’s local knowledge based database. .   
 Check data formatting for standard data representation in each filed of local 
database for every sensor. 
 If needed, convert non-standard formatting into standard data formatting 
Following is the algorithm for creating knowledge based database for each sensor 
individually.  
 INPUT TCPDUMP list file. 
 INPUT alert logs. 
 Create separate database for each sensor based on the IDMEF.  
 For each row in TCPDUMP/alert logs files. 
 IF, the row is labeled with proper attack information and standard data 
representation  
o THEN, Send to local knowledge based database. 
o ELSE Convert non standard data representation for each column into 
standard representation. 
 RETURN Knowledge based database for each sensor. 
 
Alert Filtering  
Alert filtering module filters unnecessary and unimportant alerts before sending them to 
the next processing module. In some cases, alert filtering module has zero effect on alert 
reduction as a whole. In our case, Snort and Bro generates many alerts which can be filter 
through this procedure. This is very simple and state forward unless attacks are 
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distributed and complex. For more complex alerts, alert reconstruction module could be 
added, but this is not the scope of this thesis work. We filter those particular events which 
has only one corresponding alert (not more than one alert) in global relational database. 
In our module, we extract this information by considering a particular unique alert ID, its 
corresponding source ip, destination ip, alert time and attack type or signature type. If the 
alert is generated only once and it is not the part of any further distributed attack, the alert 
is marked as false positive alert and can be filter from local alert pool (knowledge base 
database) for each sensor.   
 Select all alerts with one time occurrence in knowledge based database. 
 Check their participation within any further attack. 
 Delete the selected alerts that are not the part of any further attack. 
Following is the algorithm for alert filtering based on source and destination IPs. 
 INPUT Knowledge based database for each sensor 
 FOR every event in the knowledge based database 
 IF the appearance of Source IP/ Destination IP is only once and IP is not the 
part of other distributed attack  
o THEN  Label the event as False Positive alert 
o ELSE send alert to Knowledge based database 
 Return Filtered Knowledge based database 
Multilevel correlation and Alert prioritization  
The purpose for this level is to reduce false alarms through various correlation techniques 
based on the data traffic type and relationships among attacks pattern and their signatures. 
On the basis of these relationships, important attacks can be separated from the rest. 
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Various IDS provides detail analysis of alert signature that their sensor is capable of 
detecting. For this purpose, we considered all signatures with their priority list and 
correlated all alerts generated with those signatures type. We mainly considered 
following signatures types by carefully examining their time stamp to detect number of 
occurrences for any particular signature type alert that might be used in further attacks.  
 ICMP Timestamp Request 
 ICMP Timestamp Reply 
 ICMP Destination Unreachable Host Unreachable 
 ICMP Destination Unreachable Port Unreachable 
 Protocol Mismatching  
 Echo reply 
In next levels of correlation, we performed detailed analysis of ICMP traffic. Our 
correlation rules for this level are based on ICMP type and code number.  
 Correlation based on ICMP type and code  
 Correlation on the basis of signature priority  
 Correlation based on source IP and time stamp (specifically for TCP and 
UDP traffic) 
Following is the algorithm for False Positive Reduction based on ICMP traffic.  
 INPUT Filtered Knowledge based database for each sensor 
 FOR ICMP traffic,  
 separate the alerts based on  
o ICMP Timestamp Request 
o ICMP Timestamp Reply 
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o ICMP Destination Unreachable Host Unreachable  
o ICMP Destination unreachable Port Unreachable  
o Protocol Mismatching 
o ICMP Echo reply 
 IF events are part of distributed attack  
o THEN send to Global database 
o ELSE Label the events as False Positive alerts 
 RETURN Global database 
Following is the algorithm for False Positive Reduction based on source IP and time 
stamp for ICMP, UDP and TCP traffic.   
 INPUT Global database  
 FOR each time slot  
o Separate  time frames having more than one event  
 IF events has same source IP, same destination IP and same alert type 
o THEN Correlate alerts into single alert  
o ELSE send them to global database 
 RETURN Correlated Global database 
Each signature has priority level assigned to it. There are 3 priority levels, 1 to 3 for any 
signature type. We used these predefined priority levels for each signature and further 
perform our analysis to determine how many alerts were generated in a fixed time 
window. Based on these fixed time windows and alert signature priority, various alerts 
belong to same attack type in a specific time window were correlated. In other words, 
different alerts belong to same attack type in a fixed time window were correlated. This 
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proposed correlation technique is very useful for correlating different alerts constitute 
same attack and has huge impact for minimizing false positive alerts.   
Alert Fusion Engine based on Dempster Shafer Theory 
Building the Frame of Discernment (Ω): D-S theory of evidence need to construct the 
frame of discernment, also known as a universe of disclosure. FoD is a set of mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive possibilities denoted by (Ω). For this purpose, the very first step 
is to determine, where a network attack took place or not. This is determined through the 
process of evidence collection by network sniffing through sensor (observer).  If any 
network attack associated with these alerts has not happened, these alerts are considered 
to be the false alerts.   
Therefore our FoD for attack happened or no attack happened is  
Frame of Discernment = Ω =   
Any hypothesis H will refer to the subset of Ω for which the observer can present the 
evidence. The set of all possible subsets of Ω, including itself and the null set  is called 
the power set and designated by . We can say, the power set consists of all possible 
hypothesis  and known as focal elements . In other worlds, we may 
call  to the subset of Ω carrying hypothesis . (Where i is any number starting from 1 
to n) 
Our main focus is to detect the flooding attack and try to eliminate the false positives. 
Therefore, our main focus is on the following type of traffic:  
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Every sensor   collects the evidence of these attacks on the basis of their 
observation and assigns the basic probability assignment (bpa) function. Our goal is to 
find the true state of the system based on some evidence . This evidence has some 
degree of uncertainty towards the system state. Based on single evidence , we assign a 
probability that it supports a certain hypothesis  for a particular system state 
preposition .  
Evidence collection  
The very first step is to collect the evidence. For this purpose, we use two types of 
observations, r and s. The observation r represents the amount of evidence supporting the 
actual event happening and s represent the observation for negation of any event 
occurrence. Both r and s are known as amount of observation representing opposite 
evidence about an event occurrence. Degree of belief, disbelief or uncertainty may be 
assign to any event based on the evidence in favor or against an event happening.  
Reliability of sensors and certainty level of collected evidence  
To be the useful fusion process, the measurement of the evidence must be reliable. 
Having incorrect information is more damaging than no information. To address this 
issue, we used two very reliable sensors (Snort and Bro) for collecting the evidence. 
Moreover, we used MIT DARPA dataset 1999 for our proposed prototype evaluation. 
This dataset is the most reliable source available to the researchers for conducting their 
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experiments. As mentioned in earlier chapter, there is no perfect answer and no perfect 
measure for any evidence. The relationship between accuracy and the uncertainty is 
always been an issue for concern, especially in digital evidence collection. Reliability of 
the sensors and certainty levels of their digital evidences are two different domains. If the 
evidence collected from a sensor can be modified by external unauthorized factors, its 
reliability is compromised. On the other hand, the certainty level of collected evidence 
depends on the technical capabilities of a particular sensor to monitor specific type of 
traffic as well as the right placement of the sensor.  
Reliability of any sensor depends on these questions.  
 Is it possible to attack the sensor itself?  
 Is it possible that during the evidence collection by the sensor, the whole 
process can be influence by external factors?  
 Is it possible that evidence stored location can be attacked and its security 
might be compromised?  
Certainty level of any sensor’s digital evidence depends on some following points. 
Selecting the right category/type of the sensor based on the nature of traffic being 
monitor on the network. Various sensors and IDS are best option for one category of 
attacks but not suitable for other categories of attacks and could pass on wrong, 
incomplete and uncertain evidence to the system administrator. For example, to analyze 
SNMP traffic, any sensor with capabilities of detecting and analyzing SNMP packets is 
much better option than the other sensor with same reliability but no capability on 
detecting SNMP traffic. These sensors having same sensor reliability factor but might 
 64 
collect different certainty level of evidence for the same data traffic due to their different 
detection capabilities.  
Sensor’s configuration is another important factor for judging the certainty level 
of any sensor. Right configuration of a particular sensor enhances the certainty level of a 
sensor’s evidence. Sensors with high degree of sensitivity generates huge number of false 
positives where as low sensitive sensors might ignore the true positives. Through our 
series of experiments, we observed that if reliability factor of any sensor decreases, the 
uncertainty factor relating any proposition increases. 
As we mentioned earlier, in our research we used Snort and Bro sensors. Both are 
configured correctly and work well on our Frame of Discernment set Ω for the ICMP, 
TCP and UDP traffic. Further, there is no chance to compromise the collected evidence 
by external unauthorized factors like intrusion on stored evidence itself. During our 
research process, the configuration of each sensor remains the same. All data gathering is 
done by keeping the configuration static. Therefore we are not dealing with reliability of 
sensor during the research process. In DS rule of combination, we used reliability factor 
for each sensor as 1 mentioning out sensors are 100 % reliable. 
To address the issue of certainty level for each sensor, we defined False Positive 
Rate (FPR), True Positive Rate (TPR) and True Deduction Rate (TDR) for each sensor 
used in our research process as follows;   
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Where  
FPR = False Positive Rate of any sensor 
NOFA = Number of False Alert 
NOA = Number of Alert 
TPR = True Positive Rate 
TDR = True Deduction Rate 
NOTA = Number of True Alerts 
RA = Real Alerts 
By conducting series of experiments, we calculated the FPR, TPR and TDR for 
each sensor. Our experiments show that Bro has huge volume of false positive generation 
as compare to Snort. After multiple correlation techniques, Snort has high TDR than Bro 
despite poor performance of both sensors in detecting true alerts. Numerical values are 
given in appendix-I. On the basis of FPR, TPR and TDR values, it is obvious that each 
sensor produce correct information or faulty information. Here our FoD is θ = (Correct, 
Fault) and the power set is three elements excluding empty set is:  = {correct, fault, θ}. 
For the purpose of independence, sensors observe the network traffic separately. Correct 
represents the hypothesis for correctness of any evidence collected by any sensor. Fault 
represents its negation and universal set θ represents the uncertainty. Certainty level of 
each sensor is calculated after completing the process of multiple correlations. NOTA 
(Number of True Alerts) and RA (Real Alerts) contribute for calculating the certainty 
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level of any sensor. We calculated the certainly level of each sensor through following 
proposed methodology; 
Certainty level for Snort: 
Number of True Alerts (NOTA)-detected by Snort = 840  
Real Alerts (RA)-Actual alerts in Dataset = 1482 
True Detection Rate (TDR) = 56 %  
We assigned belief value 0.56 for sensor Snort by calculating its TDR that shows 
the capability of Snort for detecting the real attacks from provided Dataset. The 
remaining portion of total belief (1 - 0.56) i.e. 0.44 is divided equally in disbelief and 
uncertainty level of sensor Snort. To support our argument, we performed series of 
experiments and each time, Snort generated false positives with almost same degree of 
TDR. Therefore, we can say  
 )  where = Snort 
Please note that we put relative atomicity to the default base rate of 0.5. To support our 
selection for the value of = 0.5, we considered the original Jøsang [1999] definition 5 
of relative atomicity. According to Jøsang [1999], relative atomicity of x to y is the 
function defined by: 
 , x y   
In our case,  
x = (correct value) or x= (fault value) 
y = (correct, fault) 
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 , x y   
 , x y   
Therefore, in our case, = 0.5 that is equal to the default base rate for atomicity 
value.  
Certainty level for Bro:  
Number of True Alerts (NOTA) = 690  
Real Alerts (RA) = 1482 
True Detection Rate (TDR) = 46  
We assigned belief value 0.46 for sensor Bro by calculating its TDR that shows the 
capability of Bro for detecting the real attacks from provided Dataset. The remaining 
portion of total belief (1 – 0.46) i.e. 0.54 is divided equally in disbelief and uncertainty 
level of sensor Snort. To support our argument, we performed series of experiments and 
each time, Bro generated false positives with almost same degree of TDR. Therefore, we 
can say  
 )  where = Snort 
Please note that we put relative atomicity to the default base rate of 0.5. To support our 
selection for the value of 0.5, we considered the original Jøsang [1999] definition 5 of 
relative atomicity. According to Jøsang [1999], relative atomicity of x to y is the function 
defined by: 
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 , x y   
In our case,  
x = (correct value) or x= (fault value) 
y = (correct, fault) 
 , x y   
 , x y   
Therefore, in our case, = 0.5 that is equal to the default base rate for atomicity 
value.  
Evidence rules: 
The evidence gathered by intrusion detection sensors were transformed into evidence 
variables r and s where 
r = amount of evidence - supporting the actual event e occurrence 
s = amount of evidence - supporting the negation of the event e occurrence 
We are dealing with DDoS attack type which are ICMP flooding, UDP flooding or SYN 
flooding known as TCP flooding. Each of these flooding attacks is final result of many 
distributed attacks. In other words, presence of various distributed attacks within the 
fixed time slot contributes finally flooding attack. To utilize our proposed theory of 
evidence collection, in first phase, we collected all supporting distributed attacks with 
their signature types that contribute to ICMP flooding, UDP flooding and SYN flooding 
individually for each sensor type.   
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During our second phase of evidence collection, we assign a numeric value r for 
each distributed attack generated by our sensor and a numeric value to s for each absence 
of the evidence. For Snort and Bro IDS, these supporting attacks for each type of 
flooding are given in appendix F. As we mentioned earlier, we used two types of 
observations, r and s. Both r and s are known as amount of observation representing 
opposite evidence about an event occurrence. Degree of belief, disbelief or uncertainty 
may be assign to any event based on the evidence in favor or against an event happening. 
Evidence gathering process was done for 3 types of attacks detected by each sensors 
(Snort and Bro) separately.  
 
Proposed r-rule 
Our proposed r - rule for any attack type detected through any sensor is defined in the 
following 2 cases.   
Case I) For Number of Alerts (NOA) < 10 
r = 1   
 
Case II) For Number of Alerts (NOA) ≥ 10 
  r =  
  
Drop all digits after decimal point  
 
Example: Total detected attacks by Snort on March 29, 1999 slot for ICMP flooding 
against attack type s-1 are 40 i.e. r ≥ 10 therefore, case II is being followed. According to 
above rule, value of r for s-6 can be calculated as follows 
  r = 2.8  
  
r = 2 (by dropping 0.8 i.e. drop all digits after decimal point)  
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Finally, r value of s-6 attack on March 29, 1999 is 2 in this particular example.  
 
Proposed s-rule 
Initially, value 1 is given to all supporting attack types for s type observation mentioning 
no attack is detected for specific category. The s value converts to 0, in case attack for a 
particular category is detected.  
Example: Total attacks detected by Snort sensor for March 29, 1999 time slot again 
attack type s-6 is 0. In this case, s-6 has 0 values for observation s.  
 
Network traffic is analysed based on equal time interval slots for each attack type. 
We used week 4 and week 5 of DARPA dataset 1999, total 10 days of dataset. In order to 
collect alerts, we run our sensors against each trace file of the dataset. In total 19 trace 
files were used, 2 for each day. One trace file for the inside network data collection and 
one for the outside network data collection except for March 30, 1999 where only outside 
dataset trace file is available. We performed whole process of data gathering for more 
than ten times and extracted the average values to show in our results.   
Basic Probability Assignment (bpa):  
The Dempster-Shafer theory uses a number in the range [0, 1] to indicate the belief in a 
hypothesis given a piece of evidence. This number shows the degree to which the 
evidence supports the hypothesis. The impact of evidence on the subset Ω is represented 
by the function called basic probability assignment (bpa). In other word, the basic 
probability assignment (bpa) represents by m defines the mapping of the power set of Ω 
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to the interval between 0 and 1. The bpa to the null set is 0 and the summation of the 
bpa’s of all subsets of the power set is 1. The detailed bpa function is defined in the 
previous chapter.  
According to our observation, every alert generated by a sensor might be a true 
alert (true positive) or might be a false alert (false positive). Therefore we can say that 
each alert generated by any sensor has the degree of belief, degree of disbelief and degree 
of uncertainty. Dempster Shafer rule of combination do not limit any specific method for 
assigning bpa to an event. We collected the mapping between the Evidence and Opinion 
Space though following propositional expression. Note that we followed the 
Jøsang[1999] for collecting our parameters for belief, disbelief and uncertainty;  
 .......... (29’) 
 .......... (30’) 
 .......... (31’) 
Where parameter  
C represents a constant, 
b represents the belief mass in support of x  FoD (Ω) being true, 
d is the belief mass in the support of x being false, 
u ≠ 0 and represents uncertainty or the amount of uncommitted belief mass, 
r represents the amount of evidence supporting the actual event and  
s represents the amount of evidence supporting its negative. 
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In our research, constant C has the default value of 2 because according to Josang [1999], 
the default value 2 for the constant C ensures the probability density function with default 
base rate a=0.5 is a uniform probability density function. We put the base rate (a) value 
equal to 0.5 for representing opinion of any sensor relating an attack happening. The 
basic probability assignment (bpa) is assign to each alert pool generated by any sensor. In 
other words, bpa for each sensor (Snort and Bro) against each targeted alert (ICMP 
flooding, SYN flooding, UDP flooding) during every time slot duration is calculated and 
stored in a separate database. According to Jøsang [1999], the sum of the belief, disbelief 
and uncertainty function is equal to the sum of the belief mass in a BMA, equal to 1 
according to following definition  
   
The Reassignment of Mass Function between 2 sensors:  
After assigning the appropriate bpa value to each alert domain generated by two sensors 
separately, the combine mass function was reassigned between these two sensors based 
on following table.  
Table 3The reassignment of mass function between two sensors 
m1(S1) A ¬A Ω
m2(S2)
A m(A) = m1(A).m2 (A) m(φ)=m1(¬A).m2(A) m(A)=m1(Ω).m1(A)
¬A m(φ)=m1(A).m2( ¬A) m( ¬A)=m1( ¬A).m2( ¬A) m(¬A)=m1( Ω).m2(¬A)
Ω m(A)=m1(A).m2( Ω) m(¬A)=m1(¬A).m2( Ω) m( Ω)=m1( Ω).m2( Ω)  
Where  
A represent the probability that the bpa module assigns relating the current state 
of the network attack  happening,   
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¬ A represent the probability that the bpa module assigns relating the current 
state of the network attack  refutation,   
Ω represents the probability that the bpa module assigns relating the current state 
of the network attack  uncertainty.  
We used two separate combination rules for our research in order to reduce false alarm 
rate and to spot the actual intrusion happening for DDoS attacks. One is the Dempster 
rule of Combination and other is consensus operator by Jøsang. We also proposed our 
final rule of decision for both Dempster Combination and Consensus operator. The final 
results of both rules are compared in the next chapter with detailed analysis. In previous 
chapter, both rules are discussed in detail.  
Dempster-Shafer Applied to Distributed Intrusion Detection 
Our Frame of Discernment consists of two possibilities concerning network events:  
Frame of Discernment = Ω =  .......... (34) 
Where A means event is an attack and  means that event is not an attack. For this, Ω 
the power set has three focal elements: hypothesis H associated with (A) that event is a 
real attack; hypothesis  associated with (¬A) that event is not an attack and universe 
hypothesis Ω that event is either attack or not an attack.  
Next, the combination belief for hypothesis allocated to power set is define as  
 .......... (35) 
By Dempster rule of combination, we combined belief of two hypotheses as follows. 
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 .......... (36) 
 
 .......... (38) 
Where  
 
We are using two sensors in our research therefore the combination is between two 
sources. In case of more than two evidence collection sources, we can combine 
hypothesis of more resources the same way by combining the final result of two sensors 
with the third one and so on.   
To combine the various statements about the hypothesis , the Dempster-Shafer 
approach must know the reliability or trustworthiness of each sensor  participating in 
evidence collection . This is a big advantage of Dempster Shafter theory of 
combination over Bayesian approach where (in Bayesian approach) combining the 
evidence relating each hypothesis , we need to know the prior probability P(H) as well 
as every conditional probability that sensor  would offer relating evidence  when 
hypothesis  is true and when it is not. Compare to Dempster-Shafer, the Bayesian 
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approach requires much more information that most of the time might not be available for 
combination process.  
Final Decision Rule (FDR) for Dempster Shafer Combination rule.  
After applying DS rule of combination to all collected evidences for each hypothesis 
domain, we obtained final fusion belief results for 
 
Where is the final belief in support of an attack occurrence, 
represents the combined belief for not supporting the attack happening and 
 is combined uncertain about the current state of 2 or more prepositions. Number 
of total attacks for each belief level decides the final result of a fusion module. Our fusion 
module is based on the following rules.  
 If max (   
Strong combined evidence that shows the attack happening, therefore  
Final Result = True Alerts. 
 
 If max (   
Strong combined evidence that shows the attack did not happened, therefore  
Final Result= False Alerts. 
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 If max (   
Strong combined evidence that shows the uncertainty of the current situation, 
Final Result = True Alerts. 
 
 
Figure 20 Fusion Module based on Dempster Shafer Theory 
 The architecture of Fusion Module based on Dempster Shafer Rule of Combination 
Alert Fusion Engine based on Subjective Logic 
In our fusion frame work, various sensors collect the data and raise an alarm if necessary. 
The fusion component processes the generated alarms and if necessary, generates an 
alert. The generated alerts could be handled manually by system administrator or by other 
automatic response as per requirement. The opinion relating the accuracy level of an alert 
generated by fusion component helps the system administrator to deal with the alert in 
manual or automatic manner. In our frame work, we apply subjective logic on various 
sensors used for data collection and on the fusion component itself. When subjective 
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logic is applied to sensors, the collected data represent an opinion about the presence of 
an attack through collected evidence. Some evidence can generate positive opinion and 
other can generate negative opinion. In other words, each attack pool has belief, disbelief 
and uncertainty level for the presence of an attack. These levels of opinion are used by 
fusion component for fusing multiple alarms.  
Our fusion component can produce alerts based on single type or multiple types 
of alerts. This is done by calculating belief or opinion about every preposition associated 
with each alarm generated through various sensors. In our research, we have crisp 
preposition, an attack or not an attack, for the category ICMP flooding, UDP flooding or 
SYN flooding that is being attempted. By observing alarms from multiple sensors (in our 
prototype testing - Bro and Snort) opinion about the correctness of the preposition (attack 
or not attack) can be generated. Some alerts contribute in the negation of an event 
happening and on the other hand, some alerts can generate positive opinion, i.e. belief 
that the preposition is true.  
We also note that the more alarms generating the positive opinions results final 
opinion relating a preposition stronger. In our research work, we assume that our sensors 
are independent and generate independent alarms depending on their own analysis. 
Therefore, we used consensus operator to model our prototyping.  
The Consensus Operator 
According to Jøsang [1999], the consensus opinion of two possible conflicting argument 
opinions is an opinion that reflects both argument opinions in a fair and equal way. When 
two different observers have different beliefs about the truth of x based on different 
evidence about x, the consensus operator produce a consensus belief that combines the 
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two separate beliefs into one. This interpretation of belief combination can be supported 
by classical statistical inference principles discussed in Josang [2001] with formal 
justification of the consensus operator.  
Let  , ,  ,  ) and  , ,  ,  ) be opinions respectively 
held by agents A and B about the same state x, and let . 
When  0, the relative dogmatism between  and is defined by   so 
that  . Let  , ,  ,  )be the opinion such that : 
 
 ) / K 
= ( + ) / K 
) / k 
=  ) /  
= (  + )/ 2 When = = 1 
 
 ) /  
 ) /  
 79 
 = 0 
( 1 
Then  is called the consensus opinion between and representing an 
imaginary agent [A,B]’s opinion about x. In other words, by using ⊕ symbol for 
consensus operation, we can define; 
 
We used the same mapping between the Evidence and Opinion Space that was used for 
belief, disbelief and uncertainty representation in previous section for Dempster Shafer 
Theory. Josang [1999] proved that consensus operator is commutative as well as 
associative. Therefore, according to Josang [1999], we can say that the order in which the 
opinions are combined has no importance and significance. It is also noted that during the 
combination, opinion of an agent should be count only once. The fusion process should 
not allow an agent’s opinion to be counted more than once.  
Dealing with uncertainty of the sensor 
As we mentioned earlier, there are always the risks that an attacker may mislead the 
prime source of data gathering like network sensor. This process of misleading results 
false positive alarms generations by those sensors. These false positive alerts affect the 
right decision process of the fusion engine. In other words, if the protection of the sensors 
needs to be uncompromised or if an attacker might be able to mislead the fusion engine 
by generating huge false alarms, the alarms generated though those type of sensors 
should be discounted accordingly.  
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Practically speaking, no sensor generates 100 % true alerts. This means that all 
the generated alarms might not be correct. The capability of a sensor could be less 
effective for some types of attack domains. To address this issue, final result from any 
sensor should be degraded accordingly before sending the result into the fusion engine. 
Without addressing this issue, we might mislead the fusion engine for making the right 
decision.  
Let and  are two independent sensors. We introduced Subjective Logic for 
each sensor such that the fusion engine has predefined subjective opinion relating both 
sensors. We deal fusion engine opinion relating any sensor through subjective logic 
discount operator. We then used subjective logic consensus operator in order to find the 
final opinion about an attack happening by eliminating the distrust of fusion engine on 
any sensor.  Let Fusion engine F receive alert  from sensor and  from sensor  
relating an attack occurrence. Fusion System F would have formed opinion   
and   about the attack . But, in our case, sensors are not fully trustworthy; 
therefore Fusion Engine’s opinion relating both sensors,  for  and   for  
should be discounted in order to receive correct fusion result of both independent sensors. 
We have final opinion as follows:   
    
Where  
 81 
) = (  ) 
 =  
 =  
 =  
 =  
and  
  = (  ) 
 =  
 =  
 =  
 =  
 
In more compact form, we can say; 
   = )   
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Figure 21 Fusion Module based on Subjective Logic 
 The architecture of Fusion Module based on Subjective logic 
The final result of  and  are joined through consensus operator in order to 
conclude the final possible state of an attack reported by 2 uncertain sensors 
with different degree of reliability in an independent environment.  
 can be defined in two separate ways. One for K = 0 and other for K ≠ 0 
where   ) 
For K ≠ 0 
 = ( .  +  )/ K 
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 = (  ) / K 
 = (  ) / K 
 =    / 
  
and for K = 0: 
 / 2 
(  / 2 
 = 0 
= (  ) / 2 
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CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
This chapter reports the analysis of evaluation methods conducted to validate the 
effectiveness of our proposed approach. We also present the complete analysis of our 
reported results to judge the impact of our proposed methodology towards the final goal 
of the thesis. Complete set of accomplished results for data collection, alert 
normalization, alert preprocessing and alert filtering are presented in Appendix-J along 
with multilevel correlation results. Appendix-J also presents the complete series of results 
for fusion process based on DS theory and Jøsang subjective logic. 
The proposed approach for each component is discussed in previous chapter. For the sake 
of testing and evaluating any new the proposed framework, DARPA has provided a 
number of Intrusion Detection Evaluation Data Sets including 1998, 1999 2000 Datasets. 
In order to validate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed framework, the 
DARPA 1999 intrusion detection dataset was used and the generated alerts were stored in 
a MySQL database. For this purpose, separate database was created for each sensor. Java 
was used to implement various proposed algorithms. The final output of each sensor is 
converted into the standard formats in order to apply the various correlation and fusion 
rules.  
Result Analysis: 
To analyze the impact of our proposed prototype towards the final goal of our research 
work i.e. minimize the false positive alerts through correlation and fusion process, in this 
section we present the detail analysis of our final results for each major component. 
Mainly the whole process is divided into two major components i.e. alert correlation and 
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alert fusion. We present analysis of these two components individually for each sensor 
(Snort and Bro) including every attack category (ICMP flooding, UDP flooding and TCP 
flooding) 
Analysis of multilevel correlation component. 
Multilevel correlation for Snort sensor: The following horizontal plotted graph of 
DARPA 1999 dataset for 9 different days from March 29, 1999 to April 09, 1999 shows 
various alerts number. Dark horizontal line represents total alerts generated by Snort 
sensor. The light color horizontal line beside each dark line, against each date shows the 
remaining alerts after applying proposed multilevel correlation rules for Snort sensor.  
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Figure 22 (a) Multilevel Correlation - Snort 
The same information is represented in the following figure. It is obvious form the graph 
that our proposed correlation technique for Snort sensor reduced huge number of false 
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positives alerts that were not the actual attacks. The vertical straight line between the two 
lines (dark color and light color) shows the actual false alerts, reduced through proposed 
methodology.  
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Figure 23(b) Multilevel Correlation - Snort 
In the following figure, alert reduction rate for Snort senor is drawn to show the 
effectiveness of our proposed framework towards reduction of false positive alerts. Alert 
reduction rate for each day mention in the graph. The average reduction is more than 80 
% for Snort sensor.   
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Figure 24 False positive reduction rate - Snort 
 
Multilevel correlation for Bro sensor: The following horizontal plotted graph of DARPA 
1999 dataset for 9 different days from March 29, 1999 to April 09, 1999 shows various 
alerts number. Dark horizontal line represents total alerts generated by Bro sensor. The 
light color horizontal line beside each dark line, against each date shows the remaining 
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alerts after applying proposed multilevel correlation rules for Bro sensor.  
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Figure 25 (a) Multilevel Correlation - Bro 
The same information is presented in the following figure. It is obvious form the 
graph that our proposed correlation technique for Bro sensor also reduced huge number 
of false positives alerts that were not the actual attacks. Overall reduction is more than 89 
% in this case. The vertical straight line between the two lines (dark color and light color) 
shows the actual false alerts, reduced through our proposed methodology. 
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Figure 26 (b) Multilevel Correlation -Bro 
In the following line graph, alert reduction rate for Bro senor is drawn to illustrate 
the effectiveness of our proposed framework towards reduction of false positive alerts. 
Alert reduction rate for each day mention in the graph. The average reduction is more 
than 89 % for Snort sensor.   
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Figure 27 False positive reduction rate - Bro 
 
Analysis of fusion component 
Following figures shows the final result of  attack scenario derived through combining 
the bpa values of each sensor (Snort and Bro) for each attack category (ICMP and SYN). 
UDP alerts are not combined due to absent of any UDP alert detection by sensor Snort. 
 
DS Rule of Combination: From the following two figures, it is obvious that by combining 
the evidence using Dempster Shafter Rule of Combination, collected through two 
independent sources provide us more certain situation of any attack happening. Based on 
these fusion engine decisions, we can further mark those alerts which are associated with 
No-attack entry as false positives. 30-Mar-99 for ICMP flooding and 29-Mar-99, 30-Mar-
99 and 05-Apr-99 for SYN flooding are the entries with No attack. Some slots has high 
certainty level of attack happening like 29-Mar-99 for ICMP flooding with .9275 certain 
value of an ICMP DDoS attack happening. The alerts associated with high level of 
certainty level most likely contribute in DDoS attack in the particular time slot.  
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Figure 28 Attack Scenario through DS combination rule - ICMP Flooding 
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Figure 29 Attack Scenario through DS combination rule - SYN Flooding 
 
Jøsang Subjective Logic: The following figures represents final decision relating any 
attack happening derived through Jøsang subjective logic approach. Higher the belief 
level (b) represent the actual attack happening. The more value for b shows more certain, 
the attack occurred. The state of the network is undecided when uncertain value (u) is 
higher. When the disbelief value (d) is higher, it shows the network is not under DDoS 
attack. 30-Mar-99, 01-Apr-99, 06-Apr-99, 07-Apr-99, 08-Apr-99 and 09-Apr-99 for 
ICMP flooding attack. In the case of SYN flooding attack 29-Mar-99, 30-Mar-99 and 05-
Apr-99 are time slots (or the date) when state of the network is undecided because of 
higher the value of u. Please note that the same time slots in Dempster Shafer Rule of 
Combination are marked as No-Attack. As a comparison of both fusion rules, one thing is 
obvious that the Jøsang subjective approach gives more undecided states then Dempster 
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Shafer Rule of Combination. The reason behind this high level of undecided states is the 
use of less trusted sensor.  
 
 
Figure 30 Attack Scenario through Subjective Logic  - ICMP Flooding 
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Figure 31 Attack Scenario through Subjective Logic  - SYN Flooding 
 
Discussion 
There are many challenges for applying this type of attack analysis for determining the 
final opinion values of the observed alarms especially when the sensors are not fully 
trustworthy. The major challenge is to set a threshold value for any sensor for generating 
wrong information relating any situation assessment. Most of the sensors can be tunes (in 
case, these options are available to the end user) for generating dogmatic opinion where 
uncertainty level for their assessment is zero. In the case of consensus, only the sources 
with some degree of uncertainty can be used to generate a final consensus result. There 
are many ways to discount the opinion of a sensor, for example, one way is to drive the 
opinion through previous ability of the sensor for correctly detecting specific type of 
alarms. Another way is based on the various attributed that might affect the overall 
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performance of the sensor i.e. network type, network traffic type, location of the sensor 
installation, configuration changes within the sensor itself and various components 
configuration within the whole intrusion detection systems. We put our selected sensors 
on default setting and based on their degree of correct alert detection rate, discount their 
opinion. Through our research work, we concluded the right choice of different sensors 
for the fusion component is based on their independence on each other and also on their 
ability to detect various attack types. Our sensor selection options were very limited due 
to their availability. We used open source sensors with fully network support and used 
DARPA offline dataset to analyse their ability for detecting various attacks. Some 
researchers create their own test bed raw data to evaluate the proposed fusion component. 
In that case, realistic data and alerts should be included in the network traffic. This whole 
test bed requires huge system requirements and hardware support that was not possible in 
our case.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter revisits the goal of this thesis and state the final conclusions. Furthermore, it 
discusses the major contribution of this thesis work in the field of research domain. 
Finally, possible directions for future research and recommendations are given.  
Conclusion and summary of contribution: 
Deployment of an Intrusion Detection System is not sufficient for detecting a real 
intrusion. The issue of managing large number of generated alerts is a challenging task 
for any security analyst. The goal of this work, as stated earlier, is to propose, design and 
develop architecture for a fusion-based false alarm reduction module that work with 
existing Intrusion Detection Systems. Our proposed methodology has the ability to deal 
with all these aspects by introducing following modules  
 Alert collection module 
 Alert Normalization module 
 Alert Preprocessing module 
 Alert Filtering module 
Each of these modules has positive effects on reduction of false positive alerts up to some 
extent. The major goal that is, false positive reduction is achieved through  
 Multi level correlation module 
 Multi level fusion module 
Our correlation module is based on some simple and more complex correlated rules 
based on the signature types of the detected events. The alert fusion module is based on 
Dempster Shafer Theory. The collected evidence from various sensors is combined 
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through DS Rule of Combination. The proposed prototype introduces subjective logic for 
each sensor to deal with uncertainty level of each source individually. We also combined 
our collected belief through consensus operator proposed by Jøsang [1999] and compare 
the final results with DS Rule of Combination.   
Our proposed architecture for multi sensor alert reduction and fusion frame work 
is discussed in chapter 3, seems promising in its ability to eliminate the false positive 
alerts and minimizing the huge number of false alerts. Moreover, the initial steps in the 
proposed architecture are critical for the smooth functioning of our correlation and fusion 
modules. 
 In this thesis work on correlation and fusion approaches, more time was devoted 
towards the combination rules in Dempster Shafer theory and Jøsang subjective logic 
with binominal opinion representation. More consideration was given to the accurate 
mathematical representation of conflict in the intrusion domain, amount and accuracy of 
evidence and reliability of independent evidence collection sources. We also noticed that 
Dempster’s rule of combination is the most appropriate combining rule in case of all the 
evidence collection sources are reliable. This also leads to the conclusion that various 
combination rules handle the same situation differently. We concluded through our 
research work that there are number of considerations that need to be address during 
combining the evidence through Dempster-Shafer theory. These considerations include 
the level of evidence itself, the source of information, the particular domain and various 
operation used for combining the evidence.  
 Our thesis also presents the method to fuse the false alarms for presenting real 
attack scenario. This process is being achieved through reasoning method relating various 
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intrusion attacks by considering belief factor associated with these alerts and later 
combining the alarm with subjective logic. These processes reduce the false alarms rate 
and increase the trustworthiness of the final result. Our system also considers the 
reliability associated with each sensor and discounts its result accordingly. By applying 
subjective logic to our fusion system, we noticed that fusion module draw its own 
opinion about the situation by using alarms generated through the sensors and the 
reliability of a sensor.   
Recommendations and Future Work 
Intrusion detection is very important in order to preventing the system again an attack. 
Future generation Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) will be more 
incorporated into the integrated hybrid network security systems. Separate security 
solution will not be a solution any more. For developing such systems, combination of 
more complex mathematical theories and various self sustain modules would be more 
helpful in order to obtain true information relating an attack instance. The network 
attacks are becoming more distributed and complex. To detect such complex intrusions, 
NIDS need to report intrusion information in a timely manner and compact to make the 
IDS response more effective. When we talk about the compact form, it means with less 
false positive alerts. To build an effective security suit, reliable security technologies 
need to be developed and tested.  
 As an extension of this work presented in chapter 3, we may consider the study of 
various more effective security rules where the architecture include firewalls, more 
sophisticated IDS and intrusion prevention  devices. Our system addresses to single final 
result i.e, an attack or not an attack based on evidence collection and combination rules. 
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By introducing more devices in the proposed system, more complex system policies are 
needed to address the issue of intrusion prevention along with intrusion detection and 
minimizing huge false positive alerts.  
In parallel to the above proposed possible extension, the dynamic real intrusion detection 
system may be aligning with false positive reduction module. This system will help to 
refine the final result about the current system intrusion along with other available IDS 
like Snort and Bro.  
The current system can be extending to detect and eliminate false positives for not only 
ICMP, UDP and SYSN flooding but also for other categories. More efficient database 
mining approaches can be introduced for efficient data manipulation in order to decide 
about the current state of an event.  
 Another possible extension to the current proposed architecture would be the 
detailed analysis of the current situation of the system and let the system decide to launch 
an automatic response. This work needs to reconfigure the security policies randomly in 
order to prevent new occurrence of a particular intrusion. This random reconfiguration of 
system policies may result in complete failure of some system components if proper data 
follow among these components are not carefully handled through low level of software 
design policies.  
 Our proposed system of alert reduction may be implemented on the other 
combination rules (other than Dempster Shafer Rule of Combination and Jøsang 
Consensus and Discount operators) like Yager;s rule, Inagaki’s rule and Zhang’s rule. 
Various situations can be implemented individually on a single system for making more 
refined final decision. 
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 Our proposed correlation techniques can be further enhanced by introducing more 
rules based on other possible intrusion signatures. Different IDS can be used for this 
purpose for generating different signature types for other type of network traffic (other 
than ICMP, UDP and TCP). 
 In our proposed framework, materialized view of the database object can be 
introduced. It will solve the delay issue for database query response time especially in 
rapid data growth. This model will enable much more efficient access of the query at low 
cost.  
Finally, our proposed prototype can be tested on real data in a real network 
environment. At the moment, this was not possible for us. Therefore DARPA 1999 
dataset was used which is the number 1 choice for all researchers in the research domain. 
Our system can be further extending by including other Open Source IDS beside existing 
one. Moreover, we can further divide our time frame window into smaller intervals. This 
might increase our algorithm complexity but on the other hand will be helpful for 
modeling final decision with more confident.   
The main purpose for the development of the proposed architecture for false positive 
reduction through alert correlation and alert fusion methodology with collaboration with 
existing IDS is to enhance the performance of the security suit in terms of less memory 
utilization, speed up the intrusion detection procedure and to minimize the negative 
effects of huge false event. Our whole system is mainly based on the fact that using 
multiple IDS in a network environment is a good solution to increase the intrusion 
detection rate. The final output of this research work will definitely simplify the network 
administrator’s job for maintaining the network in top possible secure level.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
System Configuration and Experimental Test Bed 
We used three laptop systems for our test beds. Centralized database engine is running on 
one machine. Both IDS were installed for scanning/sniffing and data collection on the 
fastest possible machines. Third laptop is used to perform various tests and system 
parameters for smooth execution of the whole test bed. The detailed configuration with 
system specification is mention in the following section 
System Specification 
Table 4 System Specification 
Sr. #  Hardware  System Specification Plate form  
1 Laptop 1 64 bit Intel (R) Core (TM)  i5 @ 2.4 
GHz.  
8 GB RAM with 500 GB available 
disk space 
Ubuntu Release 11.10  
 64 bit 
2 Laptop 2 64 bit Intel (R) Core (TM)  i5 @ 2.4 
GHz   
8 GB RAM with 500 GB available 
disk space 
Ubuntu Release 11.10  
 64 bit 
3 Laptop 3 32 bit Intel (R) Dual Core (TM) Dual 
Core @ 2.00 GHz  
4 GB Ram with 100 GB available disk 
space 
Ubuntu Release 11.04 
Kernal Linux 2.6.32-40-
generic GNOME 2.30.2 
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4 Desktop  32 bit Intel (R) Dual Core @ 3.2 GHz  
4 GB Ram with 125 GB available disk 
space 
Ubuntu Release 11.04 
Kernal Linux 2.6.32-40-
generic GNOME 2.30.2 
5 Network 
card 
  
6 Router Linksys WRT54G wifi gateway with 
Broadcom BCM5354 @ 240 MHz 
with 8 MB RAM  
4+1 port network switch  
  
Table 5 Services running on each system 
Sr. #  Systems Services running on each System  
1 Laptop 1 Snort package, Barnyard2, Acid Base, MySQL  
2 Laptop 2 Bro package with all dependences, MySQL  
3 Laptop 3 Nessus, Eclipse, JDBC  
 
Acquiring Ubuntu Linux.  
Ubuntu’s download procedure changes over the time so going directly to Ubuntu’s 
website is much prefer choice than installing Ubuntu’s through its repository. Open the 
download address http://www.ubuntu.com/download/ubuntu/download and carefully 
select latest download version or older version of your choice depending on your system 
specification and architecture. Other option for getting Ubuntu is either through 
installation CD or by downloading through BitTorrent and burn the CD or install through 
flash drive.  
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To ensure that the Ubuntu operating system has all latest patches installed, enter 
following commands on terminal prompt.  
Sudo apt-get update 
Sudo apt-get  upgrade 
Follow the various steps for Ubuntu’s installation and configuration depending on your 
version of choice. Whole process takes almost 30 minutes to an hour depending on your 
system specification and personal choice of selecting various packages.  
 
 104 
APPENDIX B 
IDS Installation and Configuration 
As mentioned earlier, we used Snort and Bro, open source IDS for our experiments. For 
this purpose, we select the best possible available systems (laptop1 and laptop2) and 
installed both sensors on each of them. Installation process and configuration process is 
briefly mention in the following section.  
Snort 
Pre installation packages for Snort IDS: Some basic packages are needed to install and 
configure before starting Snort installation process. These packages can be installing 
through their repositories. Installing via RPM is quite easy and quick method. Remotely 
Package Manager known as RPM in Linux operating system is a powerful command line 
driven package management system capable of installing, verifying, querying and 
updating computer software packages.  These processes also download the package to the 
system by providing correct URLs directly though machine terminal command prompt 
provided that system are connected to the internet.  
The following are some basic packages listing, need to install and configure before Snort 
installation process begin. Installation can be done by entering command sudo apt-get 
install <package name>. You need Ubuntu’s root password.   
sudo apt-get install nmap 
sudo apt-get install nbtscan 
sudo apt-get install apache2 
sudo apt-get install php5 
sudo apt-get install php5-mysql 
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sudo apt-get install php5-gd 
sudo apt-get install libpcap0.8-dev 
sudo apt-get install libpcre3-dev 
sudo apt-get install install g++ 
sudo apt-get install bison 
sudo apt-get install flex 
sudo apt-get install wireshark 
sudo apt-get install libpcap-rubyNmap 
For installing MySQL database package, password must be selected carefully for root 
user and should not be forgotten. To install MySQL enter the following command on 
terminal  
sudo apt-get install mysql-server 
sudo apt-get install libmysqlclient16-dev 
 Our choice for selecting the Snort IDS is described in chapter 2 page-25 along with its 
detailed architecture and advantages over the remaining available IDS.  We used a 
dedicated system laptop 1 for Snort installation with 2 network cards. One network card 
is built in and the other was installed on external port eth0 for testing purpose and system 
load balancing.  
Supporting tools/packages for Snort: Snort also support graphic library for representing 
Snort reports in the form of pie chart. For this purposed, JpGraph package is used. After 
downloading the file, execute the following commands form the terminal shell to install 
JpGraph package. 
sudo wget http://hem.bredband.net/jpgraph/jpgraph-1.27.1.tar.gz 
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sudo mkdir /var/www/jpgraph 
sudo tar zxvf jpgraph-1.27.1.tar.gz 
sudo cp -r jpgraph-1.27.1/src /var/www/jpgraph/  
Snort Report package is an add on package module for the IDS Snort. Latest Snort Report 
should be selected and download to the system. We used Snortreport-1.3.3 for our 
system. After downloading the package, execute the command from that downloaded 
location.  
sudo tar zxvf Snortreport-1.3.3.tar.gz -C /var/www/ 
Snort report need to be configured to reflect the results generated by Snort IDS into 
MySQL databases. The main configuration file for Snort report package is srconf.php 
located on location /var/www/Snortreport-1.3.3/srconf.php. Edit this file in any editor of 
your choice for configure purpose.  
sudo pico /var/www/Snortreport-1.3.2/srconf.php 
MySQL password is required to access data from MySQL to Snort reports. Locate the 
line $pass = “YOURPASS”; by pressing <ctrl+w> and enter MySQL password to the 
$pass field.  
$pass = "YOURPASS";  
Change this to  
$pass = "YOURMYSQLPASSWORD"; 
Save the file and exit the editor mode. 
Installing new Data Acquisition API: Latest Snort versions support Data Acquisition 
Application Program Interface known as API. This API is necessary to use with Snort 
version 2.9.0 and above. This API helps Snort to capture the network traffic more 
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efficiently. Download the latest Data Acquisition API to your system. Executing 
following command from the downloaded location will install it.  
sudo tar zxvf daq-0.6.2.tar.gz 
cd daq-0.6.2 
sudo ./configure 
sudo make 
sudo make install 
sudo ldconfig 
Installing libdnet 
According to Snort web site, Unix Systems use pcap in the libpcap library and Windows 
System use port of libpcap known as WinPcap. Our system is Ubuntu, therefore we used 
libdnet package. Download the file and save to the system. Install libdnet by executing 
the following commands from the download location. 
sudo tar zxvf libdnet-1.12.tgz 
cd libdnet-1.12/ 
sudo ./configure 
sudo make 
sudo make install 
sudo ln -s /usr/local/lib/libdnet.1.0.1 /usr/lib/libdnet.1  
Download and install Snort: Download the Snort IDS’s latest version from the web site 
(http://www.Snort.org/start/download) depending on your system hardware architecture. 
Another option for installation is to install the Snort package from the Ubuntu’s 
repositories. There are chances that latest version of Snort may not be downloaded from 
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this method. Therefore, we use compile and install procedure of the source code for Snort 
IDS installation.  
From the downloaded location of Snort source code, execution of following commands 
on the command terminal will install Snort in the selected location. We select location < 
/home/faisal/Snort > for Snort installation.  
sudo tar zxvf Snort-2.9.1.2.tar.gz 
cd Snort-2.9.1 
sudo ./configure /home/faisal/Snort 
sudo make 
sudo make install 
sudo mkdir /var/log/Snort 
sudo mkdir /var/Snort 
sudo groupadd Snort 
sudo useradd -g Snort Snort 
sudo chown Snort:Snort /var/log/Snort  
Downloading and install the latest Snort Rules: Rules for generating any alert against any 
event are mention in Snort rule sets. According to Snort web site, Sourcefire 
Vulnerability Research Team (VRT) Rules are the official rules of Snort IDS. There are 
two types of Snort rules releases. One for registered user and the other for non registered 
known as subscriber release. We download latest rule set for register user < Snortrules-
snapshot-2921.tar.gz > from Snort web site.  
From the download location, execute the following command to install the package in 
</home/faisal/Snort> location.  
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sudo tar zxvf Snortrules-snapshot-2910.tar.gz -C /home/faisal/Snort 
sudo mkdir /home/faisal/Snort/lib/Snort_dynamicrules 
sudo cp /home/faisal/Snort/so_rules/precompiled/Ubuntu-10-4/i386/2.9.1.0/* \ 
/home/faisal/Snort/lib/Snort_dynamicrules 
sudo touch /home/faisal/Snort/rules/white_list.rules 
sudo touch / home/faisal/Snort/rules/black_list.rules 
Snort Configuration: The basic file for Snort configuration is < Snort.conf > located at 
location < /home/faisal/Snort/etc/Snort.conf >. We edit this file for making all necessary 
changes in order to configure Snort according to our requirement and system 
configuration. 
sudo pico /home/faisal/Snort/etc/Snort.conf 
Locate the following lines by pressing <ctrl+w> and change following lines  
var WHITE_LIST_PATH /etc/Snort/rules 
var BLACK_LIST_PATH /etc/Snort/rules 
To these lines 
var WHITE_LIST_PATH /home/faisal/Snort/rules 
var BLACK_LIST_PATH /home/faisal/Snort/rules 
Once again locate the following lines by pressing <ctrl+w> and change following 
dynamicpreprocessor directory /home/faisal/lib/Snort_dynamicpreprocessor/ 
dynamicengine /home/faisal/lib/Snort_dynamicengine/libsf_engine.so 
dynamicdetection directory /home/faisal/lib/Snort_dynamicrules 
To these lines  
Dynamicpreprocessordirectory /home/faisal/Snort/lib/Snort_dynamicpreprocessor/ 
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Dynamicengine/ home/faisal/Snort/lib/Snort_dynamicengine/libsf_engine.so 
dynamicdetection directory /home/faisal/Snort/lib/Snort_dynamicrules 
 
Locate the following line in <Snort.conf> file. Below this line  
#output unified2: filename merged.log, limit 128, nostamp, \ 
mpls_event_types, vlan_event_types 
Add following line to limit the output file size to Snort logs. 
output unified2: filename Snort.u2, limit 128 
To implement these changes, save the file and exit the editor.  
Downloading and install Barnyard2: Snort is a huge package with very complicated 
detection rules. To minimize the processing load on the Snort detection engine, 
Barnyard2 package is being installed. The basic task of Barnyard2 is to read the log files 
generated by Snort IDS and enter them into the database. Other advantage of using 
Barnyard2 is to eliminate the chance of alerts lose generated by Snort. If database service 
is not available, Barnyard2 writes all non written entries to the database, once it is again 
available. Download the current version of Barnyard2 package and save to the system.  
We unpack the Barnyard2 package through following commands for installation on 
specified location </home/faisal/Snort/barnyard2-1.8> 
sudo tar zxvf barnyard2-1.8.tar.gz 
cd barnyard2-1.8 
sudo ./configure --with-mysql 
sudo make 
sudo make install 
 111 
sudo cp etc/barnyard2.conf /home/faisal/Snort/etc 
sudo mkdir /var/log/barnyard2 
sudo chmod 666 /var/log/barnyard2 
sudo touch /var/log/Snort/barnyard2.waldo 
sudo chown Snort.Snort /var/log/Snort/barnyard2.waldo 
Configuring Barnyard2: After the Barnyard2 installation process, necessary changes and 
editing was made in Barnyard configuration file <barnyard2.conf> in order to configure 
the package according to our test bed parameters.   
sudo pico /home/faisal/Snort/etc/barnyard2.conf 
Locate the following line in the file by pressing <ctrl+w> and change them   
config reference_file: /etc/Snort/reference.config 
config classification_file: /etc/Snort/classification.config 
config gen_file: /etc/Snort/gen-msg.map 
config sid_file: /etc/Snort/sid-msg.map 
#config hostname: thor 
#config interface: eth0 
#output database: log, mysql, user=root password=test dbname=db host=localhost 
To following lines  
config reference_file: /home/faisal/Snort/etc/reference.config 
config classification_file: /home/faisal/Snort/etc/classification.config 
config gen_file: /home/faisal/Snort/etc/gen-msg.map 
config sid_file: /home/faisal/Snort/etc/sid-msg.map 
config hostname: localhost 
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config interface: eth1 
output database: log, mysql, user=Snort password=YOURMySQLPASSWORD 
dbname=Snort \ 
host=localhost 
Creating MySQL Database for Snort: Snort need separate database to store output alerts. 
We create separate Snort user and separate database name Snort. To execute these steps, 
we perform following steps from Ubuntu’s terminal. First step is to create Snort database. 
echo "create database Snort;" | mysql -u root -p 
mysql -u root -p -D Snort < ./schemas/create_mysql  
For creating Snort user with privileges to manipulate Snort database, we used following 
command on the terminal  
echo "grant create, insert, select, delete, update on Snort.* to Snort@localhost identified 
by \ 'MySQLPASSWORD'" | mysql -u root –p 
 
These steps will create user Snort, a database name Snort with following tables. 
Table 6 Snort tables list 
acid_ag acid_ag_alert acid_event acid_ip_cache 
base_roles base_user data detail 
encoding event icmphdr iphdr 
opt reference reference_system schema 
sensor sig_class sig_reference schema 
sensor sig_class sig_reference signature 
tcphdr udphdr   
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Pre Installation package for Bro IDS : Like Snort installation, Bro installation also 
requires some basic package to be install for system preparation as IDS node. The 
following are some basic packages listing, need to install and configure before Snort 
installation process begin. Installation can be done by entering command sudo apt-get 
install <package name>. You need Ubuntu’s root password.   
sudo ap-get install libncurses5-dev 
sudo ap-get install g++ 
sudo ap-get install bison 
sudo ap-get install flex 
sudo ap-get install lib-magic-dev 
sudo ap-get install libgeoip-dev 
sudo ap-get install libssl-dev 
sudo ap-get install build-essential 
sudo ap-get install python-dev 
sudo ap-get install libpcap-dev 
sudo ap-get install cmake 
sudo ap-get install swig2.0 (we installed swig1.3 due to unavailability of  swig2.0) 
Bro Installation: After successfully installing these packages, we install latest version of 
Bro IDS that is Bro2.0. We download the package file from Bro web site < 
http://www.Bro-ids.org > in the download section. Installation location for Bro IDS in 
our system is < /home/faisal/Bro-2.0 > 
tar xvzf Bro-2.0.tar.gz 
sudo ./configure --prefix=/home/faisal/Bro-2.0 
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sudo make 
sudo make install  
sudo make install Brolite 
BroControl installation: BroControl is an interactive shell for operating Bro installation 
process. Two separate modes are provided by BroControl, first is stand-alone mode for 
single system and second is cluster mode. We used stand-alone mode our system 
preparation. Download the BroControl and execute following commands from terminal 
shell will install BroControl. The configuration process is bit tedious for BroControl. 
tar xvfz Broctl-1.0.tar.gz 
~/ cd Broctl-1.0 
sudo ./configure --prefix=/home/faisal/Bro-2.0  
make 
sudo make install Broctl 
For setting path variables include bin.  
export PATH=$PATH:$/home/faisal/Bro-2.0/bin 
BroControl Configuration: Three main files Broctl.cng, nides.cnf and networks.cfg need 
to be configuring according to the network architecture and system requirements. These 
files are located in </home/faisal/Bro-2.0/etc>. These file can be edited to reflect all 
necessary changes.  
Broccoli installation and configuration: According to Bro web site < http://www.Bro-
ids.org > Brocoli is a client communication library use for create client sensors for Bro 
IDS. We followed following steps from download location of Broccoli and then 
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configuring it with Bro sensor by editing three files, Broctl.cng, nodes.cnf and 
networks.cfg.  
tar xvfz Broccoli-1.8.tar.gz 
<Download location>  cd Broccoli-1.8 
sudo ./configure --prefix=/home/faisal/Bro-2.0  
make 
sudo make install  
For setting path variables include bin.  
export PATH=$PATH:$/home/faisal/Bro/bin  
For configuring Broccoli package, edit following files located on location 
</home/faisal//Bro-2.0/etc > 
Broctl.cng8 
nodes.cnf 
networks.cfg 
Installation and configuration for hf-1.3 package: According to Bro web site, hf is a 
command line tool for replacing numeric IP address with resolved hostname. Simply 
from hf file download location, execute following commands will install it. 
tar xvzf hf.tar.gz 
cd hf-1.3 
sudo ./configure --prefix=/home/faisal/Bro-2.0 
sudo make 
sudo make install 
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Installation and configuration for cf package: According to Bro web site, cf is a command 
line tool for replacing numeric Unix timestamp with a readable representation. These 
easy to understand readable real time stamps are very important for correlation and 
various fusion techniques.  
tar xvzf cf.tar.gz 
cd cf-1.2.3 
sudo ./configure --prefix=/home/faisal/Bro-2.0 
sudo make 
sudo make install  
We create separate database with the name Bro in MySQL database for Bro IDS. 
Following tables shows the various Bro database tables names created to save Bro IDS 
output.  
Table 7 Bro-Database tables list 
conn dns dpd ftp 
http irc notice_policy notice 
packet_filter smtp_entries smtp ssh 
syslog weird   
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APPENDIX C 
Table 8 Attack Dictionary 
Alert ID Signature Name Catagory 
s-1 ICMP Destination Unreachable Port Unreachable ICMP
s-2 ICMP Destination Unreachable Host Unreachable ICMP
s-3 ICMP Echo Reply ICMP
s-4 ICMP Fragment Reassembly Time Exceeded ICMP
s-5 ICMP PING ICMP
s-6 ICMP PING *NIX ICMP
s-7 ICMP PING BSDtype ICMP
s-8 ICMP Time-To-Live Exceeded in Transit ICMP
b-1 bad_ICMP_checksum                     ICMP
b-2 bad_UDP_checksum UDP
b-3 Attacks Contribute to SYN Flooding UDP
s-9 WEB-CLIENT Telnet protocol specifier in web page attempt SYN
s-10 CHAT IRC nick change SYN
s-11 CHAT IRC channel join SYN
s-12 CHAT IRC message SYN
s-13 ATTACK-RESPONSES Invalid URL SYN
s-14 ATTACK-RESPONSES 403 Forbidden                                                                   SYN
s-15 SHELLCODE x86 NOOP                                                                               SYN
s-16 WEB-CLIENT  Script Engine Stack Exhaustion Denial of Service SYN
s-17 SHELLCODE x86 inc ecx NOOP                                                                       SYN
s-18 X11 xopen                                                                                        SYN
s-19 ATTACK-RESPONSES directory listing                                                               SYN
s-20 WEB-CLIENT BIN file download request                                                             SYN
s-21 SHELLCODE x86 inc ebx NOOP                                                                       SYN
s-22 WEB-CLIENT overflow attempt                       SYN
s-23 WEB-CGI phf arbitrary command execution attempt                                                  SYN
s-24 EXPLOIT javascript handler in URI XSS attempt                                                    SYN
s-25 WEB-CLIENT Portable Executable binary file transfer                                              SYN
s-26 POLICY potentially executable file upload via FTP                                                SYN
s-27 BAD-TRAFFIC SSH brute force login attempt                                                        SYN
s-28 FINGER / execution attempt                                                                       SYN
s-29 FINGER 0 query                                                                                   SYN
s-30 FINGER redirection attempt                                                                       SYN
s-31 FINGER root query                                                                                SYN
s-32 WEB-ACTIVEX DirectAnimation.SequencerControl ActiveX CLSID SYN
s-33 SHELLCODE Linux shellcode                                                                        SYN
s-34 WEB-MISC cookiejacking attempt                                                                   SYN
s-35 WEB-MISC Generic HyperLink buffer overflow attempt                                               SYN
s-36 WEB-CLIENT ExEmbed container buffer overflow attempt          SYN
s-37 WEB-CLIENT integer underflow attempt                SYN  
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s-38 WEB-CLIENT null string overflow attempt              SYN
s-39 WEB-CLIENT string overflow attempt                                    SYN
s-40 WEB-CLIENT structure memory corruption attempt                  SYN
s-41 SHELLCODE sparc NOOP                                                                             SYN
s-42 SHELLCODE x86 setuid SYN
s-43 RSERVICES rlogin SYN
s-44 RPC portmap listing TCP SYN
s-45 SPECIFIC-THREATS SYN
b-4 id.resp_p                                 SYN
b-5 port                                    SYN
b-6 non_IPv4_packet                          SYN
b-7 DNS_RR_unknown_type             SYN
b-8 line_terminated_with_single_CR          SYN
b-9 unescaped_special_URI_char            SYN
b-10 irc_line_too_short                      SYN
b-11 HTTP_version_mismatch              SYN
b-12 unmatched_HTTP_reply SYN
b-13 data_after_reset SYN
b-14 unescaped_%_in_URI SYN
b-15 window_recision                    SYN
b-16 SYN_after_reset              SYN
b-17 DNS_truncated_len_lt_hdr_len                          SYN
b-18 DNS_Conn_count_too_large SYN
b-19 DNS_truncated_RR_rdlength_lt_len                      SYN
b-20 excessively_small_fragment    SYN
b-21 fragment_inconsistency                             SYN
b-22 fragment_size_inconsistency                  SYN
b-23 DNS_label_len_gt_pkt                 SYN
b-24 DNS_truncated_ans_too_short         SYN
b-25 binpac exception: out_of_bound: Sys SYN
b-26 above_hole_data_without_any_acks SYN
b-27 NUL_in_line                   SYN
b-28 fragment_overlap SYN
b-29 SYN_inside_connection         SYN
b-30 excessively_large_fragment  SYN
b-31 possible_split_routing      SYN
b-32 data_before_established                   SYN
b-33 excessive_data_without_further_acks                SYN
b-34 connection_originator_SYN_ack    SYN
b-35 SYN_after_close     SYN
b-36 bad_TCP_checksum         SYN
b-37 binpac exception: string mismatch a SYN
b-38 malformed_ssh_identification SYN  
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APPENDIX D 
Various Datasets and Research Institutes 
Table 9Datasets with corresponding download addresses 
Dataset Website 
Masquerading User Data http://www.schonlau.net/intrusion.ht
ml 
DARPA 1998 Evaluation data sets (MIT) 
Intrusion Detection and Evaluation 
(IDEVAL) 
http://www.ll.mit.edu/mission/comm
unications/ist/index.html 
DARPA 1999 Evaluation data sets (MIT) 
Intrusion Detection and Evaluation 
(IDEVAL) 
http://www.ll.mit.edu/mission/comm
unications/ist/index.html 
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining 
(KDD) CUP 1999 competition data set 
http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddc
up99/kddcup99.html 
TIAA – A Toolkit for Intrusion Alert 
Analysis 
http://discovery.csc.ncsu.edu/softwar
e/correlator/ver1.0/ 
Defcon11 and 17  http://www.pcapr.net/forensics 
 
Table 10 Research Institute with corresponding reference addresses 
Institute name Reference address 
Computer Security and Intrusion Detection http://www.acm.org/crossroads/xrds11
-1/csid.html 
DEFCON Inc  http://www.defcon.com/index.php/def
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con/ 
LINCOLN LABORATORY (DARPA) 
IDEVAL 
http://www.ll.mit.edu/mission/commu
nications/ist/corpora/ideval/data/index.
html 
UCI KDD Archive (KDD) http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/ 
Cyber Defense Laboratory (TIAA) http://discovery.csc.ncsu.edu/software/
correlator/ver1.0/ 
Mu Dynamic Research Labs http://labs.mudynamics.com/ 
Xtractr ( Hybrid Cloud Application) http://www.pcapr.net/xtractr 
PCAP http://sourceforge.net/apps/mediawiki/
networkminer/index.php?title=Publicl
y_available_PCAP_files 
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APPENDIX E 
DARPA 1999 Attacks 
Five attacks types are added in DARPA 1999 evaluation dataset to cover wide range of 
various attacks instances. These five attack types are probe or scan attacks (37 instance), 
DoS (65 instance), R2L (56 instance), U2R (37 instances) and finally Data (13 instances). 
These attacks are briefly discussed in  the following section with first table for probe and 
DoS attacks. The second table shows Remote to Local (R2L), User to Root (U2R) and 
Data attacks. In each of the following 2 tables, first row mention the attack victims. These 
include Solaris, SunOS, NT, Linux and all other. Brief introduction of all these attack 
categories and their instances are mention below. More detailed information including 
detailed signature of each attack instance for DARPA 1999 dataset is available in 
[3][9][10][12]. 
Denial of Service Attacks: A denial of service attack is an attack in which the attacker 
makes some computing or memory resource too busy or too full to handle legal authorize 
requests, or denies legitimate users access to a machine. There are many varieties of 
denial of service (or DoS) attacks. Some DoS attacks (like a mailbomb, neptune, or smurf 
attack) abuse a perfectly legitimate feature. Others (teardrop, Ping of Death) create 
malformed packets that confuse the TCP/IP stack of the machine that is trying to 
reconstruct the packet.  
Probes: In recent years, a growing number of programs have been distributed that can 
automatically scan a network of computers to gather information or find known 
vulnerabilities. These network probes are quite useful to an attacker who is staging a 
future attack. An attacker with a map of which machines and services are available on a 
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network can use this information to look for weak points. Some of these scanning tools 
(satan, saint, mscan) enable even a very unskilled attacker to very quickly check 
hundreds or thousands of machines on a network for known vulnerabilities. 
 
Table 11 Probes and DoS attacks in DARPA 1999 Dataset 
 Solaris SunOS NT Linux All 
Probe (37) portsweep  
queso  
 
portsweep  
queso  
 
ntinfoscan  
portsweep  
 
lsdomain  
mscan 
portsweep 
queso 
satan 
illegal-
Sniffer 
ipsweep 
portsweep  
 
DoS(65)  neptune 
pod 
processtable 
selfping 
smurf 
syslog 
tcprest 
warezclient 
arppoison 
land 
mailbomb 
neptun 
pod 
processtable 
arppoison 
crashiis 
dosnuke 
smurf 
tcpreset 
apache2 
arppoison 
nack 
mailbomb 
neptune 
pod 
processtble 
smurf 
tcpreset 
teardrop 
udpstorm 
 
 
Remote to Local Attacks: A Remote to User attack occurs when an attacker who has the 
ability to send packets to a machine over a network—but who does not have an account 
on that machine—exploits some vulnerability to gain local access as a user of that 
machine. There are many possible ways an attacker can gain unauthorized access to a 
local account on a machine. 
User to Root Attacks: User to Root exploits are a class of exploit in which the attacker 
starts out with access to a normal user account on the system (perhaps gained by sniffing 
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passwords, a dictionary attack, or social engineering) and is able to exploit some 
vulnerability to gain root access to the system. 
Data Attacks: This is new attack type added in DARPA 1999 dataset. The prime aim of 
these attacks is to target those special files that various security policies specifies should 
be remain on the host machine. Other attack types are prevented to access those high 
security files but data attacks can have direct access of those files through bypassing the 
security policies on the host machine.  
 
Table 12 U2L, U2R and Data attacks in DARPA 1999 Dataset 
 Solaris SunOS NT Linux Cisco 
R2L (37) dict 
ftpwrite 
guest 
httptunel 
xlock 
xsnoop 
dict 
xsnoop 
dict 
framespof 
netbus 
netcat 
ppmarco 
dict 
imap 
named 
ncftp 
phf 
sendmail 
sshtrojan 
xlock 
xsnoop 
snmpget 
U2R (37) eject 
fdformat 
ffbconfig 
ps 
loadmodule casesen 
ntfsdos 
nukepw 
sechole 
yaga 
perl 
sqlattack 
xterm 
 
Data(13)  secret ntfdos 
ppmacro 
secret 
sqlattack 
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APPENDIX F 
Table 13 Attack list detected by Bro sensor 
Bro - ICMP Flooding 
ID 29-Mar-99 30-Mar-99 31-Mar-99 01-Apr-99 02-Apr-99 05-Apr-99 06-Apr-99 07-Apr-99 08-Apr-99 09-Apr-99
b-1 398 0 253 0 253 2172 0 0 0 0
Total 398 0 253 0 253 2172 0 0 0 0
Bro - UDP Flooding
ID 29-Mar-99 30-Mar-99 31-Mar-99 01-Apr-99 02-Apr-99 05-Apr-99 06-Apr-99 07-Apr-99 08-Apr-99 09-Apr-99
b-2 4 0 12 1 5 2 2 5 11 11
b-3 0 0 0 1 7 12 0 3 4 0
Total 4 0 12 2 12 14 2 8 15 11
Bro - SYN Flooding
ID 29-Mar-99 30-Mar-99 31-Mar-99 01-Apr-99 02-Apr-99 05-Apr-99 06-Apr-99 07-Apr-99 08-Apr-99 09-Apr-99
b-4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-8 0 0 159 172 92 97 109 112 261 119
b-9 0 72 573 590 242 130 361 233 329 328
b-10 55 0 41 55 58 63 0 58 59 56
b-11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-12 248 1018 2994 2338 1028 395 2047 1693 4926 15498
b-13 745 2306 3292 5120 3119 591 4651 5867 8245 4911
b-14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
b-38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1048 3396 7059 8275 4539 1276 7168 7963 13820 20912  
 
 
 
 
 125 
APPENDIX G 
Table 14 Attack list detected by Snort sensor 
Snort - ICMP Flooding 
 ID 29-Mar-99 30-Mar-99 31-Mar-99 01-Apr-99 02-Apr-99 05-Apr-99 06-Apr-99 07-Apr-99 08-Apr-99 09-Apr-99
s-1 40 21 92 56 61 492 73 38 41 72
s-2 47 18 77 73 42 1199 57 42 29 45
s-3 17 11 49 130 211 1484 98 88 138 155
s-4 23 0 0 0 18 153 0 19 17 14
s-5 11 0 0 0 31 198 0 15 11 11
s-6 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-7 0 0 0 0 0 51 0 0 0 0
s-8 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 138 50 218 292 363 3577 228 202 236 297
Snort - UDP Flooding 
 ID 29-Mar-99 30-Mar-99 31-Mar-99 01-Apr-99 02-Apr-99 05-Apr-99 06-Apr-99 07-Apr-99 08-Apr-99 09-Apr-99
- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Snort - SYN Flooding 
 ID 29-Mar-99 30-Mar-99 31-Mar-99 01-Apr-99 02-Apr-99 05-Apr-99 06-Apr-99 07-Apr-99 08-Apr-99 09-Apr-99
s-9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 0 0
s-10 0 0 12 21 19 19 20 13 13 17
s-11 20 0 19 17 13 15 18 14 15 19
s-12 38 33 91 152 99 59 42 37 51 28
s-13 10 0 54 28 21 52 65 31 68 31
s-14 0 21 54 21 27 37 74 41 101 29
s-15 16 82 73 151 76 0 0 28 65 23
s-16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17
s-17 0 0 0 14 12 0 0 0 0 41
s-18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-19 0 11 0 51 27 0 0 31 114 0
s-20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-21 0 0 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-24 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 0 0 0
s-25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-27 0 81 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-35 0 0 0 0 0 0 63 147 0 62
s-36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 71
s-37 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-42 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-43 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s-45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 84 228 314 455 294 182 310 358 427 338  
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APPENDIX H 
Table 15 Evidence Collection - Snort and Bro sensors 
Snort-ICMP Flooding Bro-ICMP Flooding 
Days r s A (icmp) ⌐ A (icmp) Ω (icmp) Belief Mass Days r s A (icmp) ⌐ A (icmp) Ω (icmp) Belief Mass
29-Mar-99 10 3 0.6667 0.2000 0.1333 1 29-Mar-99 9 0 0.8182 0.0000 0.1818 1
30-Mar-99 6 5 0.4615 0.3846 0.1538 1 30-Mar-99 0 1 0.0000 0.3333 0.6667 1
31-Mar-99 8 5 0.5333 0.3333 0.1333 1 31-Mar-99 7 0 0.7778 0.0000 0.2222 1
01-Apr-99 13 3 0.7222 0.1667 0.1111 1 01-Apr-99 0 1 0.0000 0.3333 0.6667 1
02-Apr-99 14 3 0.7368 0.1579 0.1053 1 02-Apr-99 7 0 0.7778 0.0000 0.2222 1
05-Apr-99 80 2 0.9524 0.0238 0.0238 1 05-Apr-99 45 0 0.9574 0.0000 0.0426 1
06-Apr-99 9 5 0.5625 0.3125 0.1250 1 06-Apr-99 0 1 0.0000 0.3333 0.6667 1
07-Apr-99 10 3 0.6667 0.2000 0.1333 1 07-Apr-99 0 1 0.0000 0.3333 0.6667 1
08-Apr-99 12 3 0.7059 0.1765 0.1176 1 08-Apr-99 0 1 0.0000 0.3333 0.6667 1
09-Apr-99 14 3 0.7368 0.1579 0.1053 1 09-Apr-99 0 1 0.0000 0.3333 0.6667 1
Snort-UDP Flooding Bro-UDP Flooding
Days r s A (udp) ⌐ A (udp) Ω (udp) Belief Mass Days r s A (udp) ⌐ A (udp) Ω (udp) Belief Mass
29-Mar-99 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 29-Mar-99 1 0 0.3333 0.0000 0.6667 1
30-Mar-99 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 30-Mar-99 0 1 0.0000 0.3333 0.6667 1
31-Mar-99 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 31-Mar-99 1 0 0.3333 0.0000 0.6667 1
01-Apr-99 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 01-Apr-99 2 0 0.5000 0.0000 0.5000 1
02-Apr-99 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 02-Apr-99 2 0 0.5000 0.0000 0.5000 1
05-Apr-99 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 05-Apr-99 2 0 0.5000 0.0000 0.5000 1
06-Apr-99 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 06-Apr-99 1 0 0.3333 0.0000 0.6667 1
07-Apr-99 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 07-Apr-99 2 0 0.5000 0.0000 0.5000 1
08-Apr-99 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 08-Apr-99 2 0 0.5000 0.0000 0.5000 1
09-Apr-99 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 09-Apr-99 1 0 0.3333 0.0000 0.6667 1
Snort-SYN Flooding Bro-SYN Flooding
Days r s A (syn) ⌐ A (syn) Ω (syn) Belief Mass Days r s A (syn) ⌐ A (syn) Ω (syn) Belief Mass
29-Mar-99 8 32 0.1905 0.7619 0.0476 1 29-Mar-99 25 33 0.4167 0.5500 0.0333 1
30-Mar-99 12 31 0.2667 0.6889 0.0444 1 30-Mar-99 73 33 0.6759 0.3056 0.0185 1
31-Mar-99 18 29 0.3673 0.5918 0.0408 1 31-Mar-99 148 31 0.8177 0.1713 0.0110 1
01-Apr-99 23 28 0.4340 0.5283 0.0377 1 01-Apr-99 173 31 0.8398 0.1505 0.0097 1
02-Apr-99 18 28 0.3750 0.5833 0.0417 1 02-Apr-99 98 31 0.7481 0.2366 0.0153 1
05-Apr-99 12 31 0.2667 0.6889 0.0444 1 05-Apr-99 32 31 0.4923 0.4769 0.0308 1
06-Apr-99 17 29 0.3542 0.6042 0.0417 1 06-Apr-99 150 32 0.8152 0.1739 0.0109 1
07-Apr-99 20 27 0.4082 0.5510 0.0408 1 07-Apr-99 167 32 0.8308 0.1592 0.0100 1
08-Apr-99 21 29 0.4038 0.5577 0.0385 1 08-Apr-99 284 31 0.8959 0.0978 0.0063 1
09-Apr-99 22 26 0.4400 0.5200 0.0400 1 09-Apr-99 431 31 0.9289 0.0668 0.0043 1  
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APPENDIX I 
Table 16 Calculation for Certainty level – Snort sensor 
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Table 17 Calculation for Certainty level – Bro sensor 
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APPENDIX J 
Due to the nature of the massive data was collected in order to present this in easy 
accessible form, we devote this chapter to describing how the different categories of data 
can be presented in manageable tables. Appendix-I contains the complete set of all such 
tables along with their brief descriptions 
Following first three tables show the result after data collection, alert normalization and 
alert preprocessing steps. First table shows the total connections in DARPA 1999 dataset 
detected by Bro IDS.  
Table 18 Total connections in DARPA 1999 Datasets 
Date Total connection in DARPA 1999
Time Slot in out Total
29-Mar-99 107526 21452 128978
30-Mar-99 38693 38693
31-Mar-99 171764 48312 220076
01-Apr-99 254576 54137 308713
02-Apr-99 209919 35188 245107
05-Apr-99 231765 54858 286623
06-Apr-99 209116 94252 303368
07-Apr-99 220886 48422 269308
08-Apr-99 349098 137739 486837
09-Apr-99 322408 118478 440886
Total 2077058 651531 2728589  
Please note that there is no connection available for March 30 (in) slot due to 
unavailability of dataset for the same date. The reason to include this table in very 
beginning is to provide a general idea relating the complexity of the dataset along with its 
volume.  
In the next two tables, we provide the attack lists detected by Snort and Bro 
sensors separately. These detected alerts were stored in their respective databases after 
applying alert normalization and alert preprocessing algorithms. The selected sensors 
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were used with their default detection capabilities to scan and detect intrusions within the 
binary tcpdump file of the inside and outside dataset traffics. The reason to use the 
sensors in their default settings is to minimize the effect of their own capabilities on the 
proposed prototype throughout the research process.  
In the following table, we present the total alerts detected by IDS snort. Snort reported 
total of 43267 alerts (37271 ICMP, no UDP and with 5996 TCP alerts).  
Table 19 Attacks detected by Snort sensor 
Date Darapa attacks detected by Snort
Time Slot icmp udp tcp Total
29-Mar-99 916 0 188 1104
30-Mar-99 944 0 459 1403
31-Mar-99 3054 0 572 3626
01-Apr-99 2720 0 1109 3829
02-Apr-99 4364 0 605 4969
05-Apr-99 10720 0 289 11009
06-Apr-99 2453 0 448 2901
07-Apr-99 2272 0 697 2969
08-Apr-99 7059 0 909 7968
09-Apr-99 2769 0 720 3489
Total 37271 0 5996 43267  
 
In the next table, we present the total alerts detected by Bro. Bro reports huge number of 
alerts i.e. 762336 with 3076 ICMP, 85 UDP and 759175 alerts of TCP type. It is obvious 
from these tables that both selected sensors create huge volume of alerts in their default 
settings.  
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Table 20 Attacks detected by Bro sensor 
Date Darapa attacks detected by Bro IDS
Time Slot icmp udp tcp Total
29-Mar-99 398 4 15843 16245
30-Mar-99 0 0 27282 27282
31-Mar-99 253 12 72089 72354
01-Apr-99 0 2 77647 77649
02-Apr-99 253 12 47302 47567
05-Apr-99 2172 14 41908 44094
06-Apr-99 0 2 61748 61750
07-Apr-99 0 8 69729 69737
08-Apr-99 0 18 127444 127462
09-Apr-99 0 13 218183 218196
Total 3076 85 759175 762336  
 
J.1 Alert Filtering component for Snort sensor 
Following table shows the alert filtering result based on Source IP address for Snort. 
Here, we may notice that for Snort sensor, only 1 false alert is eliminated through Alert 
Filtering component based on source IP address. This number has almost no effect on 
alert reduction process as a whole but might be helpful for other sensors that will be used 
in the future system expansion.  
Table 21 Alert Filtering based on Source IP – Snort sensor 
Date Snort - Alert Filtering based on Source IP
Time Slot icmp udp tcp Total
29-Mar-99 915 0 188 1103
30-Mar-99 944 0 459 1403
31-Mar-99 3054 0 572 3626
01-Apr-99 2720 0 1109 3829
02-Apr-99 4364 0 605 4969
05-Apr-99 10720 0 289 11009
06-Apr-99 2453 0 448 2901
07-Apr-99 2272 0 697 2969
08-Apr-99 7059 0 909 7968
09-Apr-99 2769 0 720 3489
Total 37270 0 5996 43266  
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The following table shows the alert filtering based on destination IP address for Snort. 
239 false alerts are filtered based on single entry destination IP address. Please note that 
these IP addresses are carefully checked for their further participation in any distributed 
attack in Snort database.  
Table 22 Alert Filtering based on Destination IP – Snort sensor 
Date Snort - Alert Filtering based on Destination IP
Time Slot icmp udp tcp Total
29-Mar-99 915 0 188 1103
30-Mar-99 944 0 459 1403
31-Mar-99 3054 0 572 3626
01-Apr-99 2720 0 1109 3829
02-Apr-99 4323 0 605 4928
05-Apr-99 10642 0 289 10931
06-Apr-99 2453 0 448 2901
07-Apr-99 2236 0 697 2933
08-Apr-99 7007 0 909 7916
09-Apr-99 2737 0 720 3457
Total 37031 0 5996 43027  
 
The following table describes the total reduction rate of Alert Filtering component for 
Snort sensor. Please note that the overall reduction rate for false alert is only .5555 % for 
Snort sensor with total of 240 false alarms filtered though Alert Filtering component.  
Table 23 Alert reduction rate 1 - Snort sensor 
Date Snort - Alert Reduction rate of Alert Filtering Module
Time Slot icmp udp tcp total rate
29-Mar-99 1 0 0 1 0.0000
30-Mar-99 0 0 0 0 0.0000
31-Mar-99 0 0 0 0 0.0000
01-Apr-99 0 0 0 0 0.0000
02-Apr-99 41 0 0 41 0.8320
05-Apr-99 78 0 0 78 0.7136
06-Apr-99 0 0 0 0 0.0000
07-Apr-99 36 0 0 36 1.2274
08-Apr-99 52 0 0 52 0.6569
09-Apr-99 32 0 0 32 0.9257
Total 240 0 0 240 0.5555  
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J.2 Alert Filtering component for Bro sensor 
In the following table for Bro sensor, 1846 false alerts are eliminated through Alert 
Filtering component based on source IP address. 
Table 24 Alert Filtering based on Source IP – Bro sensor 
Date Bro - Alert Filtering based on Source IP
Time Slot icmp udp tcp Total
29-Mar-99 398 4 15840 16242
30-Mar-99 0 0 27277 27277
31-Mar-99 253 12 71834 72099
01-Apr-99 0 2 77645 77647
02-Apr-99 253 12 47048 47313
05-Apr-99 2172 14 40589 42775
06-Apr-99 0 2 61745 61747
07-Apr-99 0 8 69728 69736
08-Apr-99 0 17 127444 127461
09-Apr-99 0 13 218180 218193
Total 3076 84 757330 760490  
 
The following table shows the alert filtering based on destination IP address for Bro 
sensor. 64 false alerts are filtered based on single entry destination IP address.  
Table 25 Alert Filtering based on Destination IP – Bro sensor 
Date Bro - Alert Filtering based on Destination IP
Time Slot icmp udp tcp Total
29-Mar-99 398 4 15837 16239
30-Mar-99 0 0 27228 27228
31-Mar-99 253 12 71833 72098
01-Apr-99 0 2 77644 77646
02-Apr-99 253 12 47047 47312
05-Apr-99 2172 14 40588 42774
06-Apr-99 0 2 61742 61744
07-Apr-99 0 8 69727 69735
08-Apr-99 0 15 127444 127459
09-Apr-99 0 11 218180 218191
Total 3076 80 757270 760426  
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The following table shows the total reduction rate of Alert Filtering component for Bro 
sensor. Please note that the overall reduction rate for false alert is only .2505 % for the 
Bro sensor with total of 1910 false alarms filtered though Alert Filtering component.  
Table 26 Alert reduction rate 1 - Bro sensor 
Date Bro - Alert Reduction rate of Alert Filtering Module
Time Slot icmp udp tcp Total rate
29-Mar-99 0 0 6 6 0.0369
30-Mar-99 0 0 54 54 0.1979
31-Mar-99 0 0 256 256 0.3538
01-Apr-99 0 0 3 3 0.0039
02-Apr-99 0 0 255 255 0.5361
05-Apr-99 0 0 1320 1320 2.9936
06-Apr-99 0 0 6 6 0.0097
07-Apr-99 0 0 2 2 0.0029
08-Apr-99 0 3 0 3 0.0024
09-Apr-99 0 2 3 5 0.0023
Total 0 5 1905 1910 0.2505  
 
J.3 Multilevel Correlation for Snort sensor 
This following table shows the final output of the alert correlation techniques for sensor 
Snort, based on selected signatures types. These signature types are mentioned in the 
previous chapter along with the algorithm. It is quite obvious from the table that the total 
alerts are now reduced to 17133 after correlating and eliminating almost 25894 alerts. 
This proposed technique has huge impact for the reducing of false positive alerts 
generated by our selected sensor Snort. 
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Table 27 Correlation based on Signature type - Snort sensor 
Date Snort - Correlation based on Signature type
Time Slot icmp udp tcp total
29-Mar-99 349 0 188 537
30-Mar-99 226 0 459 685
31-Mar-99 409 0 572 981
01-Apr-99 497 0 1109 1606
02-Apr-99 561 0 605 1166
05-Apr-99 6946 0 289 7235
06-Apr-99 456 0 448 904
07-Apr-99 539 0 697 1236
08-Apr-99 638 0 909 1547
09-Apr-99 516 0 720 1236
Total 11137 0 5996 17133  
 
The following table shows the further false positive reduction for sensor Snort based on 
timestamp and source IP address. Different alerts belong to same attack type in a fixed 
time intervals were correlated. This proposed correlation technique is very useful for 
correlating different alerts constitute same attack and has huge impact for minimizing 
false positive alerts. Finally, 8614 alerts are leftover for fusion process to deal with. Total 
of 34653 false positive alerts (almost 80% of total generated alerts) has been eliminated 
by proposed multilevel correlation techniques for Snort sensor.  
Table 28 Correlation based on time stamp and IP - Snort sensor 
Date Snort - Correlation based on timestamp and IP
Time Slot icmp udp tcp Total
29-Mar-99 138 0 107 245
30-Mar-99 50 0 228 278
31-Mar-99 218 0 314 532
01-Apr-99 292 0 455 747
02-Apr-99 363 0 294 657
05-Apr-99 3577 0 182 3759
06-Apr-99 228 0 310 538
07-Apr-99 202 0 358 560
08-Apr-99 236 0 427 663
09-Apr-99 297 0 338 635
Total 5601 0 3013 8614  
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J.4 Multilevel Correlation for Bro sensor 
The following table shows the further false positive reduction for sensor Bro based on 
timestamp and source IP address. Different alerts belong to same attack type in a fixed 
time intervals were correlated. This proposed correlation technique is very useful for 
correlating different alerts constitute same attack and has huge impact for minimizing 
false positive alerts. Finally, 78548 alerts are leftover for fusion process to deal with. 
Total of 683788 false positive alerts (almost 89% of total generated alerts) has been 
eliminated by proposed false alert generation techniques for Bro sensor. 
Table 29 Correlation based on time stamp and IP - Bro sensor 
Date Bro - Correlation based on timestamp and IP
Time Slot icmp udp tcp Total
29-Mar-99 398 4 1045 1447
30-Mar-99 0 0 3347 3347
31-Mar-99 253 12 7058 7323
01-Apr-99 0 2 8274 8276
02-Apr-99 253 12 4538 4803
05-Apr-99 2172 14 1275 3461
06-Apr-99 0 2 7165 7167
07-Apr-99 0 8 7962 7970
08-Apr-99 0 13 13820 13833
09-Apr-99 0 9 20912 20921
Total 3076 76 75396 78548  
 
In the following series of tables, we present the final results of our fusion engine. In 
appendices section, appendix H presents the values of bpa for each attack type detected 
by both sensors for each time slot individually. In the following first section, these 
calculated bpa values (belief, disbelief and uncertainty) are used in DS combination rule 
to draw the final result of the network state (attack or no attack). In second section, we 
present detailed calculation through subjective logic for leading toward the final attack 
scenario.  
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J.5 DS Rule of Combination – Demspter Shafer Theory 
ICMP Flooding 
Table 30 DS rule of combination - ICMP Flooding 
DS Combination Rule-ICMP Flooding - March 29, 1999 Final Values
Sensors Snort m1 (H) m1(⌐ H) m1(Ω) K 0.1636
Bro Reliability 1 1 1 m12 (H) 0.9275
Mass 0.6667 0.2000 0.1333 m12 (⌐H) 0.0435
m2 (H) 1 0.8182 0.5455 0.1636 0.1091 m12(Ω) 0.0290
m2(⌐ H) 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
m2(Ω) 1 0.1818 0.1212 0.0364 0.0242 Decision Attack  
DS Combination Rule-ICMP Flooding - March 30, 1999 Final Values
Sensors Snort m1 (H) m1(⌐ H) m1(Ω) K 0.1538
Bro Reliability 1 1 1 m12 (H) 0.0000
Mass 0.4615 0.3846 0.1538 m12 (⌐H) 0.5152
m2 (H) 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 m12(Ω) 0.1212
m2(⌐ H) 1 0.3333 0.1538 0.1282 0.0513
m2(Ω) 1 0.6667 0.3077 0.2564 0.1026 Decision No-Attack  
DS Combination Rule-ICMP Flooding - March 31, 1999 Final Values
Sensors Snort m1 (H) m1(⌐ H) m1(Ω) K 0.2593
Bro Reliability 1 1 1 m12 (H) 0.8600
Mass 0.5333 0.3333 0.1333 m12 (⌐H) 0.1000
m2 (H) 1 0.7778 0.4148 0.2593 0.1037 m12(Ω) 0.0400
m2(⌐ H) 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
m2(Ω) 1 0.2222 0.1185 0.0741 0.0296 Decision Attack  
DS Combination Rule-ICMP Flooding - April 01, 1999 Final Values
Sensors Snort m1 (H) m1(⌐ H) m1(Ω) K 0.2407
Bro Reliability 1 1 1 m12 (H) 0.6341
Mass 0.7222 0.1667 0.1111 m12 (⌐H) 0.2683
m2 (H) 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 m12(Ω) 0.0976
m2(⌐ H) 1 0.3333 0.2407 0.0556 0.0370
m2(Ω) 1 0.6667 0.4815 0.1111 0.0741 Decision Attack  
DS Combination Rule-ICMP Flooding - April 02, 1999 Final Values
Sensors Snort m1 (H) m1(⌐ H) m1(Ω) K 0.1228
Bro Reliability 1 1 1 m12 (H) 0.9333
Mass 0.7368 0.1579 0.1053 m12 (⌐H) 0.0400
m2 (H) 1 0.7778 0.5731 0.1228 0.0819 m12(Ω) 0.0267
m2(⌐ H) 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
m2(Ω) 1 0.2222 0.1637 0.0351 0.0234 Decision Attack  
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DS Combination Rule-ICMP Flooding - April 05, 1999 Final Values
Sensors Snort m1 (H) m1(⌐ H) m1(Ω) K 0.0228
Bro Reliability 1 1 1 m12 (H) 0.9979
Mass 0.9524 0.0238 0.0238 m12 (⌐H) 0.0010
m2 (H) 1 0.9574 0.9119 0.0228 0.0228 m12(Ω) 0.0010
m2(⌐ H) 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
m2(Ω) 1 0.0426 0.0405 0.0010 0.0010 Decision Attack  
DS Combination Rule-ICMP Flooding - April 06, 1999 Final Values
Sensors Snort m1 (H) m1(⌐ H) m1(Ω) K 0.1875
Bro Reliability 1 1 1 m12 (H) 0.4615
Mass 0.5625 0.3125 0.1250 m12 (⌐H) 0.4359
m2 (H) 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 m12(Ω) 0.1026
m2(⌐ H) 1 0.3333 0.1875 0.1042 0.0417
m2(Ω) 1 0.6667 0.3750 0.2083 0.0833 Decision Attack  
DS Combination Rule-ICMP Flooding - April 07, 1999 Final Values
Sensors Snort m1 (H) m1(⌐ H) m1(Ω) K 0.2222
Bro Reliability 1 1 1 m12 (H) 0.5714
Mass 0.6667 0.2000 0.1333 m12 (⌐H) 0.3143
m2 (H) 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 m12(Ω) 0.1143
m2(⌐ H) 1 0.3333 0.2222 0.0667 0.0444
m2(Ω) 1 0.6667 0.4444 0.1333 0.0889 Decision Attack  
DS Combination Rule-ICMP Flooding - April 08, 1999 Final Values
Sensors Snort m1 (H) m1(⌐ H) m1(Ω) K 0.2353
Bro Reliability 1 1 1 m12 (H) 0.6154
Mass 0.7059 0.1765 0.1176 m12 (⌐H) 0.2821
m2 (H) 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 m12(Ω) 0.1026
m2(⌐ H) 1 0.3333 0.2353 0.0588 0.0392
m2(Ω) 1 0.6667 0.4706 0.1176 0.0784 Decision Attack  
DS Combination Rule-ICMP Flooding - April 09, 1999 Final Values
Sensors Snort m1 (H) m1(⌐ H) m1(Ω) K 0.2456
Bro Reliability 1 1 1 m12 (H) 0.6512
Mass 0.7368 0.1579 0.1053 m12 (⌐H) 0.2558
m2 (H) 1 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 m12(Ω) 0.0930
m2(⌐ H) 1 0.3333 0.2456 0.0526 0.0351
m2(Ω) 1 0.6667 0.4912 0.1053 0.0702 Decision Attack  
 139 
Table 31DS Combination rule result - ICMP Flooding 
DS Combination Rule-ICMP Flooding
Date m12(H) m12(⌐ H) m12(Ω) Final Decision 
29-Mar-99 0.9275 0.0435 0.0290 Attack
30-Mar-99 0.3636 0.5152 0.1212 No-Attack
31-Mar-99 0.8600 0.1000 0.0400 Attack
01-Apr-99 0.6341 0.2683 0.0976 Attack
02-Apr-99 0.9333 0.0400 0.0267 Attack
05-Apr-99 0.9979 0.0010 0.0010 Attack
06-Apr-99 0.4615 0.4359 0.1026 Attack
07-Apr-99 0.5714 0.3143 0.1143 Attack
08-Apr-99 0.6154 0.2821 0.1026 Attack
09-Apr-99 0.6512 0.2558 0.0930 Attack  
SYN Flooding 
Table 32 DS rule of combination - SYN Flooding 
DS Combination Rule-SYN Flooding - March 29, 1999 Final Values
Sensors Snort m1 (H) m1(⌐ H) m1(Ω) K 0.4222
Bro Reliability 1 1 1 m12 (H) 0.1827
Mass 0.1905 0.7619 0.0476 m12 (⌐H) 0.8146
m2 (H) 1 0.4167 0.0794 0.3175 0.0198 m12(Ω) 0.0027
m2(⌐ H) 1 0.5500 0.1048 0.4190 0.0262
m2(Ω) 1 0.0333 0.0063 0.0254 0.0016 Decision No-Attack  
DS Combination Rule-SYN Flooding - March 30, 1999 Final Values
Sensors Snort m1 (H) m1(⌐ H) m1(Ω) K 0.5471
Bro Reliability 1 1 1 m12 (H) 0.4752
Mass 0.2667 0.6889 0.0444 m12 (⌐H) 0.5229
m2 (H) 1 0.6759 0.1802 0.4656 0.0300 m12(Ω) 0.0018
m2(⌐ H) 1 0.3056 0.0815 0.2105 0.0136
m2(Ω) 1 0.0185 0.0049 0.0128 0.0008 Decision No-Attack  
DS Combination Rule-SYN Flooding - March 31, 1999 Final Values
Sensors Snort m1 (H) m1(⌐ H) m1(Ω) K 0.5468
Bro Reliability 1 1 1 m12 (H) 0.7455
Mass 0.3673 0.5918 0.0408 m12 (⌐H) 0.2535
m2 (H) 1 0.8177 0.3004 0.4839 0.0334 m12(Ω) 0.0010
m2(⌐ H) 1 0.1713 0.0629 0.1014 0.0070
m2(Ω) 1 0.0110 0.0041 0.0065 0.0005 Decision Attack  
DS Combination Rule-SYN Flooding - April 01, 1999 Final Values
Sensors Snort m1 (H) m1(⌐ H) m1(Ω) K 0.5090
Bro Reliability 1 1 1 m12 (H) 0.8153
Mass 0.4340 0.5283 0.0377 m12 (⌐H) 0.1839
m2 (H) 1 0.8398 0.3644 0.4437 0.0317 m12(Ω) 0.0007
m2(⌐ H) 1 0.1505 0.0653 0.0795 0.0057
m2(Ω) 1 0.0097 0.0042 0.0051 0.0004 Decision Attack  
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DS Combination Rule-SYN Flooding - April 02, 1999 Final Values
Sensors Snort m1 (H) m1(⌐ H) m1(Ω) K 0.5251
Bro Reliability 1 1 1 m12 (H) 0.6685
Mass 0.3750 0.5833 0.0417 m12 (⌐H) 0.3302
m2 (H) 1 0.7481 0.2805 0.4364 0.0312 m12(Ω) 0.0013
m2(⌐ H) 1 0.2366 0.0887 0.1380 0.0099
m2(Ω) 1 0.0153 0.0057 0.0089 0.0006 Decision Attack  
DS Combination Rule-SYN Flooding - April 05, 1999 Final Values
Sensors Snort m1 (H) m1(⌐ H) m1(Ω) K 0.4663
Bro Reliability 1 1 1 m12 (H) 0.3024
Mass 0.2667 0.6889 0.0444 m12 (⌐H) 0.6951
m2 (H) 1 0.4923 0.1313 0.3391 0.0219 m12(Ω) 0.0026
m2(⌐ H) 1 0.4769 0.1272 0.3285 0.0212
m2(Ω) 1 0.0308 0.0082 0.0212 0.0014 Decision No-Attack  
DS Combination Rule-SYN Flooding - April 06, 1999 Final Values
Sensors Snort m1 (H) m1(⌐ H) m1(Ω) K 0.5541
Bro Reliability 1 1 1 m12 (H) 0.7324
Mass 0.3542 0.6042 0.0417 m12 (⌐H) 0.2666
m2 (H) 1 0.8152 0.2887 0.4925 0.0340 m12(Ω) 0.0010
m2(⌐ H) 1 0.1739 0.0616 0.1051 0.0072
m2(Ω) 1 0.0109 0.0038 0.0066 0.0005 Decision Attack  
DS Combination Rule-SYN Flooding - April 07, 1999 Final Values
Sensors Snort m1 (H) m1(⌐ H) m1(Ω) K 0.5228
Bro Reliability 1 1 1 m12 (H) 0.7902
Mass 0.4082 0.5510 0.0408 m12 (⌐H) 0.2089
m2 (H) 1 0.8308 0.3391 0.4578 0.0339 m12(Ω) 0.0009
m2(⌐ H) 1 0.1592 0.0650 0.0877 0.0065
m2(Ω) 1 0.0100 0.0041 0.0055 0.0004 Decision Attack  
DS Combination Rule-SYN Flooding - April 08, 1999 Final Values
Sensors Snort m1 (H) m1(⌐ H) m1(Ω) K 0.5391
Bro Reliability 1 1 1 m12 (H) 0.8653
Mass 0.4038 0.5577 0.0385 m12 (⌐H) 0.1341
m2 (H) 1 0.8959 0.3618 0.4996 0.0345 m12(Ω) 0.0005
m2(⌐ H) 1 0.0978 0.0395 0.0545 0.0038
m2(Ω) 1 0.0063 0.0025 0.0035 0.0002 Decision Attack  
DS Combination Rule-SYN Flooding - April 09, 1999 Final Values
Sensors Snort m1 (H) m1(⌐ H) m1(Ω) K 0.5124
Bro Reliability 1 1 1 m12 (H) 0.9183
Mass 0.4400 0.5200 0.0400 m12 (⌐H) 0.0813
m2 (H) 1 0.9289 0.4087 0.4830 0.0372 m12(Ω) 0.0004
m2(⌐ H) 1 0.0668 0.0294 0.0347 0.0027
m2(Ω) 1 0.0043 0.0019 0.0022 0.0002 Decision Attack  
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Table 33 DS Combination rule result - SYN Flooding 
DS Combination Rule-SYN Flooding
Date m12(H) m12(⌐ H) m12(Ω) Final Decision 
29-Mar-99 0.1827 0.8146 0.0027 No-Attack
30-Mar-99 0.4752 0.5229 0.0018 No-Attack
31-Mar-99 0.7455 0.2535 0.0010 Attack
01-Apr-99 0.8153 0.1839 0.0007 Attack
02-Apr-99 0.6685 0.3302 0.0013 Attack
05-Apr-99 0.3024 0.6951 0.0026 No-Attack
06-Apr-99 0.7324 0.2666 0.0010 Attack
07-Apr-99 0.7902 0.2089 0.0009 Attack
08-Apr-99 0.8653 0.1341 0.0005 Attack
09-Apr-99 0.9183 0.0813 0.0004 Attack  
J.6 Attack scenario through Subjective Logic – Jøsang 
ICMP Flooding 
Table 34 Jøsang Subjective Logic - ICMP Flooding 
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Table 35 Jøsang Subjective Logic result - ICMP Flooding 
Subjective Logic-ICMP Flooding
Date b d u a Final Decision 
29-Mar-99 0.5218 0.0855 0.3927 0.5000 Attack
30-Mar-99 0.2360 0.2836 0.4804 0.5000 Undecided
31-Mar-99 0.4549 0.1451 0.4000 0.5000 Attack
01-Apr-99 0.3707 0.1689 0.4604 0.5000 Undecided
02-Apr-99 0.5404 0.0692 0.3904 0.5000 Attack
05-Apr-99 0.6561 0.0098 0.3341 0.5000 Attack
06-Apr-99 0.2884 0.2448 0.4669 0.5000 Undecided
07-Apr-99 0.3415 0.1877 0.4708 0.5000 Undecided
08-Apr-99 0.3621 0.1745 0.4634 0.5000 Undecided
09-Apr-99 0.3784 0.1640 0.4576 0.5000 Undecided  
SYN Flooding 
Table 36 Jøsang Subjective Logic - SYN Flooding 
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Table 37 Jøsang Subjective Logic result - SYN Flooding 
Subjective Logic-SYN Flooding
Date b d u a Final Decision 
29-Mar-99 0.1949 0.4654 0.3397 0.5000 No Attack
30-Mar-99 0.2986 0.3652 0.3362 0.5000 No Attack
31-Mar-99 0.3788 0.2873 0.3339 0.5000 Attack
01-Apr-99 0.4115 0.2558 0.3328 0.5000 Attack
02-Apr-99 0.3624 0.3027 0.3349 0.5000 Attack
05-Apr-99 0.2469 0.4147 0.3383 0.5000 No Attack
06-Apr-99 0.3729 0.2930 0.3341 0.5000 Attack
07-Apr-99 0.3990 0.2673 0.3337 0.5000 Attack
08-Apr-99 0.4152 0.2524 0.3324 0.5000 Attack
09-Apr-99 0.4393 0.2282 0.3325 0.5000 Attack  
J.7 Multilevel correlation for Snort 
In the following table, alerts detected by Snort sensor from DARPA dataset 1999 are 
given beside the total number of remaining alerts after multilevel correlation process. 
Total alerts are reduced from 43267 to 8614 with almost 80 % reduction 
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Table 38 Multilevel Correlation result - Snort sensor 
Date Darapa attacks detected by Snort Alerts after Correlation
Time Slot icmp udp tcp Total icmp udp tcp Total
29-Mar-99 916 0 188 1104 138 0 107 245
30-Mar-99 944 0 459 1403 50 0 228 278
31-Mar-99 3054 0 572 3626 218 0 314 532
01-Apr-99 2720 0 1109 3829 292 0 455 747
02-Apr-99 4364 0 605 4969 363 0 294 657
05-Apr-99 10720 0 289 11009 3577 0 182 3759
06-Apr-99 2453 0 448 2901 228 0 310 538
07-Apr-99 2272 0 697 2969 202 0 358 560
08-Apr-99 7059 0 909 7968 236 0 427 663
09-Apr-99 2769 0 720 3489 297 0 338 635
Total 37271 0 5996 43267 5601 0 3013 8614
 
Following table represent the reduction rate per each day for Snort sensor. The huge 
number of false positive alerts reduction shows the effectiveness of our various proposed 
correlation rules and methodology. Please note that, Snort reports no alert for UDP traffic 
data unlike Bro which reports little amount of alerts for UDP traffic. 
Table 39 Reduction rate - Snort sensor 
Date Total reduction and reduction rate
Time Slot icmp udp tcp Total rate %
29-Mar-99 778 0 81 859 77.81
30-Mar-99 894 0 231 1125 80.19
31-Mar-99 2836 0 258 3094 85.33
01-Apr-99 2428 0 654 3082 80.49
02-Apr-99 4001 0 311 4312 86.78
05-Apr-99 7143 0 107 7250 65.86
06-Apr-99 2225 0 138 2363 81.45
07-Apr-99 2070 0 339 2409 81.14
08-Apr-99 6823 0 482 7305 91.68
09-Apr-99 2472 0 382 2854 81.80
Total 31670 0 2983 34653 80.09  
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J.8 Multilevel correlation for Bro 
In the following table, alerts detected by Bro sensor are given beside the total number of 
remaining alerts after multilevel correlation process. Total alerts are reduced from 
762336 to 78612 with almost 89% reduction.  
Table 40 Multilevel Correlation result - Bro sensor 
Date DARPA attacks detected by Bro Alerts after Correlation
Time Slot icmp udp tcp Total icmp udp tcp Total
29-Mar-99 398 4 15843 16245 398 4 1048 1450
30-Mar-99 0 0 27282 27282 0 0 3396 3396
31-Mar-99 253 12 72089 72354 253 12 7059 7324
01-Apr-99 0 2 77647 77649 0 2 8275 8277
02-Apr-99 253 12 47302 47567 253 12 4539 4804
05-Apr-99 2172 14 41908 44094 2172 14 1276 3462
06-Apr-99 0 2 61748 61750 0 2 7168 7170
07-Apr-99 0 8 69729 69737 0 8 7963 7971
08-Apr-99 0 18 127444 127462 0 15 13820 13835
09-Apr-99 0 13 218183 218196 0 11 20912 20923
Total 3076 85 759175 762336 3076 80 75456 78612
 
 
Following table represent the reduction rate per each day for Bro sensor. 
Table 41 Reduction rate - Bro sensor 
Date Total reduction and reduction rate
Time Slot icmp udp tcp Total rate %
Time Slot 0 0 14795 14795 91.07
29-Mar-99 0 0 23886 23886 87.55
30-Mar-99 0 0 65030 65030 89.88
31-Mar-99 0 0 69372 69372 89.34
01-Apr-99 0 0 42763 42763 89.90
02-Apr-99 0 0 40632 40632 92.15
05-Apr-99 0 0 54580 54580 88.39
06-Apr-99 0 0 61766 61766 88.57
07-Apr-99 0 3 113624 113627 89.15
08-Apr-99 0 2 197271 197273 90.41
Total 0 5 683719 683724 89.69  
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APPENDIX K 
List of Abbreviation 
ASCII: American Standard Code for Information Interchange 
bpa: Basic Probability Assignment 
CISSP: Certified Information Systems Security Professional 
CVE: Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 
DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DDoS attack: Distributed Denial of Service attack 
DNS: Domain Name System 
DST: Dempster Shafer Theory 
FDR: Final Decision Rule 
FoD: Frame of Discernment 
FTP: File Transfer Protocol 
FPR: False Positive Rate 
HIDS: Host-based Intrusion Detection System  
HTTP: The Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
ICMP: Internet Control Message Protocol 
IDS: Intrusion Detection System 
IDMEF: Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format 
IDWG: Intrusion Detection Working Group 
IPS: Intrusion Prevention System 
LAN: Local Area Network 
MANET: Mobile Ad hoc Network 
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MySQL: My Structured Query Language 
NSF: National Science Foundation 
NIDS: Network-based Intrusion Detection System 
NOA: Number of Alerts 
NOTA: Number of True Alerts 
NOFA: Number of False Alert 
R2L: Remote to Local 
RA: Real Attacks 
RDBMS: Relational Database Management System 
SNMP: Simple Network Management Protocol 
SSL: Secure Sockets Layer 
TCP: Transmission Control Protocol 
TDR: True Detection Rate 
U2R: User to Root 
URI: Uniform Resource Identifier 
UDP: User Datagram Protocol 
WAN: Wide Area Network 
XML: Extensible Markup Language 
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